Somewhere around 1992 I stopped following Derrida’s work. This event didn’t occur abruptly, it still persists, and is delayed, repressed. I think that there was no special reason, while actually there were several. That was the time when the grand debate around Modernism/Postmodernism was coming to an end and when with the break-up of Yugoslavia the conditions in Macedonian society started to change. Expectations that democratic processes would enter all parts of society were interfered with through fear of war that was already going on in Croatia and in Bosnia. Communist oligarchies, transformed into political parties, illegal privatization, university structures building bastions around their chairs became the features of the new reality. All in all, those were the beginnings of the turbulent period that we fell into.

Precisely at that time, in those conditions, I started to ask myself certain questions I considered as unanalyzable. What would it mean to be, in such conditions, a Derridaean? Or more precisely, what does Derrida, as a significant philosophical figure of our time, represent for...
за демократските процеси во Македонија? Од друга страна, верувах и се упие верувам, дека одредени интритисични теми, проблеми и праксено на философијата треба да се сдружат како технички праксено на дисциплината. Но, тоа не значи дека целата философија на некој философ, на некое движение или правец не може, не сме и нема да има политички последици.

Меѓутоа, стварноста и настаните ги демантираа моните сфакања. Во тоа време, оние коишто беа оценувани како дериваовци или постмодернисти, беа сместувани во некаков политички кош, од каде требаше да се излезе или како авангарда на македонската демократија (но скрочено по моделот на авангардата на комунидиската трансформација) или како некој кој загрозува несериозности, било да се тоа политички, економски или интелектуални. Имане во што заведувачко во сета таа работа. Имане такви кои, колнејки се во својата интелектуална честост, се проектирала в ниеовското барање за восстравување нови вредности и завршува како „дворски“ интелектуалци на новите олигархи; некои станувајќи професори кои со својот деконструктивистички жаргон ги маа епусираа како своите постари колеги професори, така и своите студенти, иако недоволно сигурни дека тоа што го зборуваат е на вистина така.

Анализата на таквата констелација на односите во македонското општество покажува дебоки траги на борба за политичка моќ. Верувах дека не станувае збор за некаква оригинална политичка појава, туку за деконструкција од која што извираше потенцијална политичка моќ. До почетокот на де ведесеттите Дерива немаше проследено какви се или какви би биле политичките импликации на

The analysis of such an assemblage of relations in Macedonian society showed deep traces of a political power struggle. I believe that it was not some kind of original political phenomenon, but a deconstruction oozing potential political power. Until the beginning of the `90s, Derrida hadn’t followed through what the political implications of deconstruction are or what they would be. Although he did this later on with a set
деконструкцијата. Иако тоа го направи подоцна со низа политички текстови од кои најочуваното беше оној за Маркс (Marx), деконструктивистичкиот ангажман во Македонија не се темелеше на тие теоретски увиди. Деконструктивистичкиот ангажман беше доволно реформаторски за да ги подричи догматските и конзервативните структури и практики, и доволно нерадикален да не предизвика вистински реформски процеси. Трикот со деконструкцијата во пракса беше пробиен: доволно е да се усвои жаргонот или дискурсот на деконструкцијата за да се биде in, и истовремено работите да останат каде што се, или ако приликите испаднат поволни да се добие уште повеќе. Деконструкцијата нема ништо со вистината, вистината е невозможна позиција, стварна е само моќта.

Навистина беше зачудувачко дека тоа што требаше да претставува децентрирана структура на познанието, знаењето, полека се претвора во интелектуален и општествен прагматичен mainstream. Изгледа смешно, па и грозно, на пример, на категрите по литература или философија да се предава „знаење“ со кое се тврди дека со философијата и со литературата е завршено, дека философијата во својата суштина е литературата и така натаму и така натаму. Сето тоа беше поткрепено со текстовите на Дерида и на „останатите постмодернистички автори“ како што се Рорти (Rorty), Хасан (Hassan), Лиотар (Liotard), Бодријар (Baudrillard). Како што споменав, некои од постарите професори и интелектуалци беа маѓепаци од новите интелектуалци, или барем се правеа такви плашејќи се за нивниот општествен статус. Но, имаше и такви кои даваа отпор. На категрата по философија, на пример, доминантна, ако не и во целост, беше струјата на маркистички ориентираниите професори. Тие своите наставни прог-

of political texts of which the most awaited was the one on Marx, the deconstructionist engagement in Macedonian was not based on those theoretical insights. The deconstructionist engagement was sufficiently reformatory to undermine the dogmatic and conservative structures and practices and sufficiently unradical to bring about true reformative processes. The catch in the deconstruction of practice was revealed: it is sufficient to adopt the jargon or discourse of deconstruction to be in, and to have things remain where they stand, or if the circumstances turn out favourable to gain even more. Deconstruction has nothing to do with truth; truth is an impossible position, real is the power alone.
There is sufficient reason for such positioning of deconstructionist intellectuals and conservative Marxists towards analytical philosophy. Derrida, as we know him and interpret him, was already packed as a product of American and English left-oriented critics and interpreters that originated from feminist or gay movements; not to mention the Yale school represented by Paul de Man and Barbara Johnson. That really isn’t a particular novelty for the Anglo-American codification of Derrida’s deconstruction; the novelty is in the intellectual audience that appeared following the fall of the Eastern bloc and American dominance. The language of deconstruction

rami ги завршува со Сартр (Sartre). Не се изучува ниту францурнските филозофи Адорно (Adorno) и Хоркхаймер (Horkheimer), иако барем тие требааше да им бидат блиски; не се предава ниту филозофите од аналитичката филозофија иако по некој стоеште во нивните програми како што се Витгенштајн (Wittgenstein), Русел (Russell), Карнап (Carnap). Она што им беше и сè уште им е заедничко на новите деконструктивистички и на на оните конзервативните интелектуалици е нетрпеливоста кон аналитичката филозофија. Фобијата од анализите беше правдана почнувајќи со забелешките за филозофската неинспиративност на аналитичката филозофија, па сè до идеолошките ставови на марксистичката филозофија за аналитичкиот сцинтиззам. Деконструктивистите пак, се потпираа на филозофските увиди на Рорти кој се обидуваше да ги деконструира современите истражувања во аналитичката филозофии за проблемите на јазикот и умот, а како клучен аргумент за победата на деконструкцијата над аналитичката филозофија ги сметаа култииот текст на Дерида „Потпис настан контекст“ и дискусијата со Серл (Searle) за прашањата од теоријата на говорните чинови.
Derrida; the new intellectual public will emerge with the fall of the eastern bloc and American domination. The language of deconstruction was and still is used as a language of the new intellectuals; its intention provides peaceful coexistence with the conservative Marxists. I think that what was really going on was the following: working on deconstruction by itself did not also mean assuming of a political standing or engagement, however the choice to deal with deconstruction in certain political and cultural conditions, politically meant a lot.

Deconstructionist Gestures

We could look at these vaguely sketched events as deconstructionist gestures. I would like them to be taken as something that surrounds ‘Derrida’, as phenomena that, although seemingly insignificant and trivial, comply with the condition of being presented as readings of deconstruction. If ‘deconstruction’ does not relate only to what Derrida does in his texts, but happens in different ‘texts’ such as experience or society as a set of de-constructions (deconstructions), then we can follow the events that accompany ‘Derrida’ as deconstructions. However, this does not concern some biographical,
The relation between the deconstructive gestures and the deconstruction of ‘Derrida’ could be presented in the following manner: when an attempt is made to locate, follow or, finally, to understand ‘deconstruction’, i.e. to define, clarify or pose certain parameters of coherency, actually an attempt is made to make implications in the direction of its value for, for example, applicability, intellectual contribution, political fight. I am not saying that such implications cannot or may not be made, but for the class of cases that I’m speaking about, implicativeness of ‘deconstruction’ is a contextual frame that precedes the dialogue with ‘Derrida’. This feature of deconstruction could be called ‘deconstructive exposure’: the always...
existential possibility of misinterpreting, misunderstanding or misreading of ‘deconstruction’ and its intrinsic characteristic to be inscribed, to be axiomized or pragmatically structured in relation to some context.

Let us express the nature of deconstructive gestures more plastically. We can freely say that all attempts for analysis, presentation, comparison, critical observance, systematization, dialogue, argument, etc., are only metaphors, metonymies, analogies, fetishizations, insinuations, parables of the ‘deconstruction of Derrida’. On the other hand, ‘deconstruction’ itself, precisely due to its inscription in cultures, i.e. in institutional streams, exposes itself to be an event of some deconstructionist gesture. It is not exposed to further deconstructions, but to some kind of total displacement. In other words, what represents the implicativeness of ‘deconstruction’, that precedes it as its contextual frame, is a hermeneutical horizon of expectation; that is, reductionist and pragmatic by nature. Deconstructive gestures are nothing else but processes of reading ‘deconstruction’ in the current discourses of culture.

Facing that challenge does not pass anyone that is in some way in relation with the deconstructive undertakings of Derrida, and even Derrida himself, when he defends, clarifies, comments his own texts or the viewpoints and actions of others connected to ‘deconstruction’. Those that formalize ‘Derrida’ and present him
Questions in regard to deconstructive gestures are issues on the establishment of deconstruction. The analysis of such gestures is manifold due to the fact that it focuses on several aspects: on the contents of deconstruction itself, on its status and on the context in which the dialogue is led within the two previous aspects. The example of a deconstructionist gesture that I wish to portray concerns the position of deconstruction in the context of the dialogue analytical/continental philosophy. That is quite an interesting case due to the specific structure of the context. On one hand, there is the attempt to establish a dialogue with Derrida from an analytical perspective, constantly accentuating the problem of the relation analytical/continental philosophy. On the other hand, the dialogue constantly opens the issue of the status and belonging of Derrida’s texts: do they belong in philosophy or do they not, at the same time opening the concern of inscription of deconstruction within continental philosophy. I consider this context as particularly important because it also opens up some other topics, such as those on the 'Anglophonic Derrida', that I mentioned at the beginning of this text,
but also the topics such as the issue on philosophical style, literariness or the possibility of formalization of deconstruction. Exemplification of deconstructive gestures appears on the borders and loops of the given context, in forms that are usually considered irrelevant for an essential contents’ analysis. The detection of the symptoms is the starting level and to it I will give my attention.

Philosophy as we know it today comes in a dichotomic form, namely as analytical and continental philosophy. Although at first glimpse it may seem that it concerns some conditional and extrinsic classification of the philosophical corpus, arguments on the differences reveal more and more that the issue concerned is, maybe, a more essential classification. There is a set of classification principles – starting with the technical questions of philosophy as a discipline, and reaching to its social aspects – with which the question on the status and place of philosophy in society is posed in the most direct manner. The questions on the principles of classification may be posed metaphilosophically, which contributes to the certain tension between the nature of those principles: the tension between the normative and descriptive aspect.

Maybe the most direct clash until now, of analytical philosophy and Derrida’s deconstruction regarding the criteria of philosophical, of belonging to philosophy, including all aspects that we mentioned, happened on the occasion of Derrida’s receiving of an honorary degree at the University of Cambridge. On that occasion, an open letter was sent, signed by Barry Smith, editor, at that time, of the respected magazine The Monist and
Смит (Barry Smith), тогашен уредник на угласното списание „Монист“ и уште од многу други философи од аналитичка провениенција, меѓу кои и иконата на аналитичката философија Вилар ван Орман Квајн (Willard Van Orman Quine).

by many other philosophers of analytical provenience, among which the icon of analytical philosophy Willard van Orman Quine.

From Professor Barry Smith and others:
The Times (London), Saturday, May 9, 1992

Sir, The University of Cambridge is to ballot on May 16 on whether M. Jacques Derrida should be allowed to go forward to receive an honorary degree. As philosophers and others who have taken a scholarly and professional interest in M. Derrida’s remarkable career over the years, we believe the following might throw some needed light on the public debate that has arisen over this issue.

M. Derrida describes himself as a philosopher, and his writings do indeed bear some of the marks of writings in that discipline. Their influence, however, has been to a striking degree almost entirely in fields outside philosophy -- in departments of film studies, for example, or of French and English literature.

In the eyes of philosophers, and certainly among those working in leading departments of philosophy throughout the world, M. Derrida’s work does not meet accepted standards of clarity and rigour.

We submit that, if the works of a physicist (say) were similarly taken to be of merit primarily by those working in other disciplines, this would in itself be sufficient grounds for casting doubt upon the idea that the physicist in question was a suitable candidate for an honorary degree.
M. Derrida’s career had its roots in the heady days of the 1960s and his writings continue to reveal their origins in that period. Many of them seem to consist in no small part of elaborate jokes and the puns "logical phallusies" and the like, and M. Derrida seems to us to have come close to making a career out of what we regard as translating into the academic sphere tricks and gimmicks similar to those of the Dadaists or of the concrete poets. Certainly he has shown considerable originality in this respect. But again, we submit, such originality does not lend credence to the idea that he is a suitable candidate for an honorary degree.

Many French philosophers see in M. Derrida only cause for silent embarrassment, his antics having contributed significantly to the widespread impression that contemporary French philosophy is little more than an object of ridicule.

M. Derrida’s voluminous writings in our view stretch the normal forms of academic scholarship beyond recognition. Above all -- as every reader can very easily establish for himself (and for this purpose any page will do) -- his works employ a written style that defies comprehension.

Many have been willing to give M. Derrida the benefit of the doubt, insisting that language of such depth and difficulty of interpretation must hide deep and subtle thoughts indeed.

When the effort is made to penetrate it, however, it becomes clear, to us at least, that, where coherent assertions are being made at all, these are either false or trivial.
Academic status based on what seems to us to be little more than semi-intelligible attacks upon the values of reason, truth, and scholarship is not, we submit, sufficient grounds for the awarding of an honorary degree in a distinguished university.

Yours sincerely,
Barry Smith (Editor, The Monist)

Almost at the very same time, Derrida commented on this event in an interview:

The question of knowing what can be called “philosophy” has always been the very question of philosophy, its heart, its origin, its life-principle. Since this gesture, which is originally and constitutively a philosophical gesture, is both repeated and examined in everything I write, since my work would have no sense outside its explicit, recurrent, and systematic references to Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, and several other authors (whether in the canon or not), references made over a period of thirty years, the motives of those who wish to deny that my work is “philosophy” must be sought elsewhere. That is their problem, not mine. Most often, I think these inquisitors confuse philosophy with what
they have been taught to *reproduce* in the tradition and style of a particular institution, within a more or less well protected—or rather, less and less well protected—social and professional environment.

However different the motives for the assessments of the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of deconstruction and of Derrida as its protagonist, one thing is undoubtedly certain: in thirty years and more, Derrida has not yet succeeded in bringing deconstruction closer to his greatest critics, nor have they, the philosophers of analytical provenience, found a way to reconstruct the implicit doctrine of Derrida’s philosophy. Their doubts, prejudice even, about the existence of a philosophical doctrine in Derrida’s work, were supported by him with a set of ‘views’ and ‘notes’, and even entire passages of his books and texts on how philosophy cannot do so, nor succeeds in seeing or determining what he works and what he addresses.

The unsuccessfulness of the attempts for an arguable argument led to the so-called *ethical* reading of Derrida, strongly expressed in the works of authors such as: Simon Critchley, Gayatri Spivak, Geoffrey Bennington, John Caputo, John Sallis, Drucilla Cornell. David Golumbia, one of the protagonists of the *ethical* reading of Derrida, makes a point that such an approach allows for the understanding of Derrida’s intervention in the Western discursive practice called philosophy, i.e. his deconstructionist gestures in the relations between the activity called philosophy and the production of what is called philosophical doctrines. According to Golumbia, what this reading of Derrida implies is Derrida’s posi-


се бараат на друго место. Тоа е нивен проблем, а не моj. Најчесто сметам дека овие жестоки испитувања ја мешаат философijата со тоа што ги научиле да го *репродуцираат* во традициjата и стилот на одредена институциjа, во рамките на подобро или полошо чувана – или подобро, полошо и помалку добро чувана – општествена и професионална средина.

Колку и да се различни мотивите за оценките за успешноста или неуспешноста на деконструкциjата и на Дерида како неjzin протагонист, едно е ненамено сигурно: веќе трисет и повеќе години Дерида не успеа да ја доближи деконструкциjата до неговите наjголеми критичари, а ниту тие, философите од аналитичката провенienциjа не изнaјда начин да ја реконструираат имплицитната доктрина на Дerидаовата философijа. Нивните сомнежи, па дури и предубедувањa за постоjнe философска доктрина во работата на Дерида, тоj ги охрабривше со низа „ставови“ и „забелешки“, па дури целi пасажи од неговите книги и текстови за тоа како философijата не може ниту успешна да го види или да го определи тоа што тоj го работи и кон коjшто сe обраќа.

Неуспешот на обидите за аргументирана расправа водешe кон таканаречното *еtichко* читањe на Дерида, наjмногу изразено во трудовите на авторите како што сe: Саjмон Критчили (Simon Critchley), Гa-јатри Спивак (Gayatri Spivak), Цeфри Бенингтон (Geoffrey Bennington), Џон Капуто (John Caputo), Џон Салис (John Sallis), Друсила Корнел (Drucilla Cornell). Дejвид Голамбиja (David Golumbia), еден од протагонистите на *етичко* читањe на Дерида, истакнува дека со таквиот пристап овозможува да се разбере Деридовата интервенциjа во Западната дискурзнa пракса наречена философиjа, односно, неговите деконструктивистички гестови во ре-
Analytical/Continental and Derridaean

Bobi Badarevski

To analyze “philosophic discourse” in its form, its modes of composition, its rhetoric, its meta-phors, its language, its fictions, everything that resists translation, and so forth, is not to reduce it to literature. It is even a largely philosophical task (even if it does not remain philosophical throughout) to study these “forms” that are no longer just forms, as well as the modalities according to which, by interpreting poetry and literature, assigning the latter a social and political status, and seeking to exclude them from its own body, the academic institution of philosophy has claimed its own autonomy, and practiced a disavowal with relation to its own language, what you call “literality” and writing in general; it thereby misrecognized the norms of its own discourse, the relations between speech and writing, the procedures of canonization of major or exemplary texts, and so forth. Those who protest against all these questions mean to protect a certain institutional authority of philosophy, in the form in which it was frozen at a given moment. By protecting themselves against these questions and against the transformations that the questions call for or suppose, they are also protecting the institution against philosophy.
Ваквата позиција Голамбија ја гледа и во неговата реакција на Аферата Кембриџ. Меѓутоа, ваквото објаснување на односот на деконструкцијата и аналитичката философија го изместува тежиштето на можноста од востоциштавање на дијалогот. Дури и да се признае тривијалноста за историската поврзаност помеѓу философските и продукцијата на философските доктрини, очигледна е промената на тезите: темите и фокусот на интересот на аналитичката философија беа и се она што може да се оквалификува како теорија и знаење во Деридаовите текстови, но не и она за што зборува Голамбија. Трансформацијата на деконструкцијата во историска доктрина за историската институционализираност на философските и нејзините дискурси, ја претвора деконструкцијата во еден историзам, изместувајќи ја и така непопуларната слика на деконструкцијата како сериозен философски потфат.

Контекстот што го нуди етички читање на деконструкцијата е повеќе политички и тоа се обидува деконструкцијата да ја „искористи“ за цели поинакви од оние што би можеле да ги детектираме како вообичаени интенцији на деконструкцијата. Тоа е исто така едно редуктивистичко читање на Дерида. Редуктивистички е и приказот на аналитичката философија како целина и позиција што й се спротиставува на деконструкцијата. Клишето којшто се повторува во изборот на аналитичките философи или ставови за аисторичноста на философската и желбата за некаков универсален логички јазик, ја покажуваат или неинформираноста на авторите на проетните читање или неискрената и нефер намера кон публикуата. Оние за кои тие зборуваат или сè уште се на платните списоци на државните фондови за наука и образование, или се веќе историја, а аисторискиот став за философската, доколку постоел во таква форма, е заминат со нив.

Golumbia also sees this position in his reaction to the Cambridge Affair. However, this interpretation of the relation of deconstruction and analytical philosophy disturbs the base of the possibility of establishing a dialogue. Even if the triviality of the historical bond between philosophy and the production of philosophical doctrines is recognized, the change in the theses is obvious: the topics and the focus of the interest of analytical philosophy were and are what can be qualified as theory and knowledge in Derrida’s texts, but not including what Golumbia is talking about. The transformation of deconstruction in an historical doctrine on historical institutionalization of philosophy and its discourses turns deconstruction into an historicism, thereby disturbing, the already unpopular image of deconstruction as a serious philosophical undertaking.

The context that is offered by the ethical reading of deconstruction is one that is more political and it tries to ‘use’ deconstruction for purposes other than those that we could be able to detect as normal intentions of deconstruction. It is also a reductionist reading of Derrida. The portrayal of analytical philosophy as a whole and a position that withstands deconstruction is also reductionist. The reoccurring cliché in the choice of the analytical philosophers or positions on the ahistoricity of philosophy and the desiring of a universal logical language, reveal either the uninformedness of the authors of the pro-ethic reading or the insincerity and dishonest intention towards the audience. Those that they speak of are either still on the pay-rolls of state science and educational funds, or are already history and the ahistorical position on philosophy, if it ever were in such form, is gone with them.
Another group of authors is trying to approach deconstruction from another aspect. They neither try to study Derrida’s doctrines, nor to position it in some kind of historicism. They simply compare, interpret, cross Derrida’s philosophy with the philosophy of the analytical philosophers such as Davidson, Quine, Wittgenstein, Sellers. These undertakings would not have been accepted as something unusual if something that appears unanalysable was not concerned. In their naïve sincerity in what they are doing, it sometimes appears as such a natural thing to compare the theories of language and significance of certain analytical philosophers with some explicit analyses or with Derrida’s reconstructed theories.

The most common examples of dialogue with deconstruction in the context of comparative analyses are the similarities in the views on language of Quine and of Davidson. The established differences concern either the discursive, style, historical or biographical contexts.

However possible these comparative approaches may be in principle, yet their deconstructionist gesture is recognized in the extrapolation of the various discourses into a single argumentative matrix. The idea of ‘comparative approach’ is to set (not to make impossible) the rules of transformation of some argumentative line, along and throughout which the arguments of various discourses – those of deconstruction and those of the compared analytical philosopher – interconnect in some appropriateness in regard to a certain issue or theme. In order to accomplish that, aside from the principle of analogy that rules in interpretation, it is necessary to portray deconstruction in analytical terms or to present some of the supposed deconstructionist operations with certain ana-
tyči termini ili некои од претпоставените деконструктивистички операции да се прикажат со одредени аналитички потези. Но, важи и обратното: аналитичката архитектура на резонирањето да се преведе во деконструктивистички термини. Многу е веројатно дека некому којшто е добро упатен и обучен во деконстраuktivistичката интерпретативна пракса, ваквите компаративни контексти би му изгледале како стратегиска осмислена деконструкција на односот аналитичка философија/деконструкција, со голема доза на грошеска пародија. Но, не е така. Авторите на текстот со целит свој авторитет и сериозност се обидуваат да ја претстават деконструкцијата и нејзината смисленост. Доколку не успеваат во тоа, тие не ја доведуваат во прашање само острина на своите аналитички пера, туку тоа значи дека со интелитибилноста на деконструкцијата нешто не е во ред.

Една од карактеристиките за кои обично се смета дека довољно ја покажуваат разликата помеѓу аналитичката и континенталната философија е местото и улогата што аргументот го има во философските текстови. Во аналитичката философија, аргументот има поголем простор и ресpekt наспроти реторичките елементи на континенталната философија. Аргументирано да се расправа, да се докажува и да се брани ставот или стојалиштето, без да се пре-раскажува нечие стојалиште (како што тое го прават деконструктивистичките постмодернисти) се суштинските белези на аналитичкото дебатаирање и расправа. Но, како да се води аргументирана расправа со Дерида? Како да се разбере непријатното искуство на Фуко (Foucault) и Серл (Searle), кој во интервјуто за Reason (февруари, 2000) вели:

One of the characteristics that is usually deemed to sufficiently show the difference between analytical and continental philosophy is the place and the role that the argument takes in philosophical texts. In analytical philosophy, the argument takes up a greater space and respect as opposed to the rhetorical elements of continental philosophy. To argue argumentatively, to prove and defend a view or standpoint without narrating someone’s standpoint (as deconstructionist postmodernists do), are the inherent features of analytical debating and argument. But how to have an agruable argument with Derrida? How to understand the unpleasant experience of Foucault and Searle, who in the interview for Reason (February, 2000) says:
With Derrida, you can hardly misread him, because he’s so obscure. Every time you say, “He says so and so,” he always says, “You misunderstood me.” But if you try to figure out the correct interpretation, then that’s not so easy. I once said this to Michel Foucault, who was more hostile to Derrida even than I am, and Foucault said that Derrida practiced the method of obscurantisme terroriste (terrorism of obscurantism). We were speaking French. And I said, “What the hell do you mean by that?” And he said, “He writes so obscurely you can’t tell what he’s saying, that’s the obscurantism part, and then when you criticize him, he can always say, ‘You didn’t understand me; you’re an idiot.’ That’s the terrorism part.”

These well-known qualifications of the ‘obscure terrorist’ were taken to determine deconstruction in regard to philosophical texts. However, I think that these comments are not directed at Derrida’s personality. As I mentioned earlier, Derrida didn’t succeed in convincing philosophers of the calibre of Searle, Foucault, Quine that deconstruction is something that can be argued with argumentation. Also Derrida himself, at one of the last conferences with the analytic philosophers, calls attention to and recognizes the argumentation ‘issue’:

You see, it occurs a long, long time after another one, that I would like briefly to recall, when I delivered the lecture on différence, not far from here, in Oxford, in 1967. I was totally mad to go to Oxford then to give that lecture! On that occasion the silence which followed it was obviously eloquent. Elocently saying: ‘There is no arguing here and there is no prospect of arguing with this man, or with this discourse.’ Strawson was there – and very politely kept silent. Ryle was there – didn’t say a word. It was very embarrassing for me, a very embarrassing situation. Ayer started...
I couldn’t insist that I understand this statement of Derrida, but I couldn’t accept that it is yet another one of his ‘performances’, because that is very unfair to his interlocutors at the conference. On the other hand, the very event that he is narrating is very illustrative for the possibility to give arguments for and against deconstruction, its status and consequences. What Derrida announces with this confession as possible, namely, the possibility of an argument, an arguable argument on deconstruction is contradictory to his views on the place and establishment of deconstruction in regard to philosophical, i.e. metaphysical discourse. Provided this argumentation is not possible, and having in mind the promised and the spoken, the implications would be very unpleasant for both Derrida and his deconstruction.
Можеби не станува збор за неприфатлив гест направен со некаква пропедевтска умисла, туку за „деконструктивистички гест“ кој во својот „двоен гест“ (double gesture) го сместува и Дерида и деконструкцијата? Како што напоменавме погоре, соочувањето со предизвикот на деконструктивистичките гестови не го одминува никого, па дури ни самото Дерида. Нема сомнение дека станува збор за „деконструктивистички гест“ кој истовремено го тривијализира и спекулативно нё поставува кон делото на Дерида. Нема сомнение дека тоа е уште еден од оние гестови коишто повеќе од десет години го проследуваат и го одлажуваат мојот прекин на следењето на Дерида.

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