The ways in which feminists have been reading Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s work until recently have mostly been limited to criticism or even complete refutation of their concept of *becoming-woman*. Today, the critical feminist approach towards their work has shifted. It has been somehow enriched by complex and cautious interests in their concepts of rhizomatics, desire, event, and assemblages. Nevertheless, between the two radical oppositional feminist readings of *A Thousand Plateaus*, pro or contra its most relevant concept, there is still room for discussing the subtle intrinsic contradictions within *becoming-woman* without necessarily abandoning their important philosophic thought altogether.¹

This essay aims to examine the notion of *becoming-woman* from a contemporary feminist perspective and to address and contextualise both its feminist critique and the possible positive feminist use. I assume that any feminist criticism of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s work today needs to be much more subtle, but also any conclusive assertions of its feminist value should be carried out in a very cautious manner.

¹ This essay aims to examine the notion of *becoming-woman* from a contemporary feminist perspective and to address and contextualise both its feminist critique and the possible positive feminist use. I assume that any feminist criticism of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s work today needs to be much more subtle, but also any conclusive assertions of its feminist value should be carried out in a very cautious manner.
било конклюзивно тврдение за неговата феминистичка вредност мора да биде изведено на мощн претпазлив начин.

Главното прашање поврзано со овој вид обид за конструктивна феминистичка критика би било прашањето кое веќе го постави Алис Џердин (Alice Jardine), „зошто тогаш Д+Г го привилегираат зборот жена?“ Имено, јасно е дека насїтанување-жена има посебно место помеѓу другите насїтанувања: насїтанување-минорен, насїтанување-живоино, насїтанување-дейе, итн. Според Делез и Гатари, сите настанувања „зайочнуваат и Јоминуваат низ насїтанување-жената“. Сепак, според Доротеја Олковски (Dorothea Olkowski), не е извесно дали воведувањето на овој концепт е нужно привилегирачко.

Олковски укажува на едно од малкуте конкретни тврдени на Делез и Гатари кои звучат како насїтанување-жената како навистина централно за сите настанувања и го наведува следниот цитат „[ж]ената како моларен ентитет мора да-настане-жена, така што мажот исто така настанува – или може да-настане-жена.“ Сите настанувања се молекуларни, вклучително човечките настанувања. Настанувањата се преобразуваат самите себеси или, попрецизно, тие го подразбираат менувањето помеѓу две фази или состојби, што само по себе е друга состојба.

„Делез и Гатари прават разлика помеѓу актуалното моларно тело на жената и молекуларното настанување-жената забележувајќи дека впишаното тело или актуализацијата на женското тело е моларна, додека настанување-жената е нешто сосем друго."

Она што го нарекуваме моларен ентитет е, на пример, жената дефинирана од нејзината форма, обладена со органи и функции и назначена за субјект. Настанување-жената не е имитирање на овој ентитет или трансформирање на себеси во него... овие нераздвојни

The main question linked to this kind of attempt at a constructive feminist critique would be the question already asked by Alice Jardine, “why then do D+G privilege the word woman”? Namely, it is clear that becoming-woman has a special place among other becomings: becoming-minor, becoming-animal, becoming-child, etc. According to Deleuze and Guattari, all becomings “begin and pass through becoming-woman.” However, according to Dorothea Olkowski, it is not certain whether the introduction of this concept is necessarily privileging.

Olkowski points to one of the few concrete claims of Deleuze and Guattari that sounds very much as if becoming-woman was really central to all becomings and she quotes: “[w]oman as a molar entity must become-woman, so that the man also becomes – or can become-woman.” All becomings are molecular, including human becomings. Becomings transform themselves or more precisely they entail shifting between two phases or states, which is in itself another state. “Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between the actual molar body of woman and the molecular becoming-woman by noting that the inscribed body or actualisation of the woman’s body is molar, while becoming-woman is something else entirely.”
aspects of the becoming-woman are not necessarily a privileged position and what it does to the rest of concepts in *A Thousand Plateaus*. It is obvious that the notion of becoming-woman, even though treated as so important, is closely linked with the other becomings, particularly with becoming-girl and becoming-minor.

**Becoming-girl**

Deleuze and Guattari note that the issue of becoming-woman is all about the body, but not about owning the body: it is rather about its stealing. In fact, it is about stealing the body from the girl, not allowing to her to be with her body: “the girl and child do not become; it is becoming itself that is a girl or child. The child does not become an adult any more than the girl becomes a woman; the girl is the becoming-woman of each sex, just as the child is the becoming-young of every age.” But the question is, if becoming-woman is the girl herself, then what comes before the girl and whether there is another
becoming between the becoming-girl and becoming-woman?

One might also think “about the implications of becoming-woman as the key to all becomings—not because of any feminist concerns about the appropriation of women, but because of the centring of one becoming or one term as the base of all becomings, the place where all becomings must come in order to proceed. This assumes that there is a stable point, a stable becoming to which all becoming-moleculars are connected.”11

All this sounds problematic especially if taking into account Deleuzean insistence on radical singularities. Namely, becoming-woman turns to be the one fixated centre of all molecular becomings.

If we think about what might be vibrating between the notions of those becomings and between becoming-woman and the girl, the potential for a radical micropolitics may come further to the surface. ...[With] The inscribing and forcing the girl to conform to accepted norms, her body is stripped of her. At the same time, her becoming—all that she could be on the molecular level—is stripped away from her.12

According to Jenny Bay, becoming the molecular woman is actually becoming the girl. She points to the fact that Deleuze and Guattari never say that “the girl is ‘reclaimed’ in each of us or that the girl inside of us all is set free.”13 Therefore, this girl is a special condition that was blocked by the state apparatus, a gender which is linked to biology.
**Identities**

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**Becoming-minor**

Becoming-minor, to use the Deleuzean concept, is to ditch the inherited position and not only to identify with the position of the other, the weaker or minor identity, but also to foster such an identity by giving an example. According to Deleuze, *becoming-minor* simultaneously needs two different movements: one by which the subject will be withdrawn from the majority, and another by which a new term will rise up from the minority.¹⁴ *Becoming-minor* consists of “double agents,” multiplicities that produce each new statement, so that any individual statement is already marked by the statements of the next “agents,” and thus builds up to completeness. However, completeness is non-representable.

Deleuze constructs his dialectics around the problem of how to affirm a productive continuity through a search for completeness, whilst also responding to the proposition that continuity is never a matter of identities or representations. In other words, we can never represent or identify continuity, even relatively and in an open-ended transforming way.¹⁵

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**Naстанување-минорен**

Naстанувањето-минорен, да го употребиме делезовскиот концепт, значи да ја отфрлиме наследената позиција и не само да се идентификуваме со позицијата на другиот, послабиот или помалиот идентитет, туку исто така да усвоиме еден таков идентитет преку давањето пример. Според Делез, *настанување-минорен* едновремено изискува две различни движења: едно со кое субјектот ќе биде отфрлен од мнозинството, и друго со кое од малцинството ќе произлезе нов термин.¹⁴ *Настанување-минорен* се состои од „двојни агенти“, мултиплициитети кои го произведуваат секој нов изказ, така што секој индивидуален изказ е веќе обележан од изказите од следните „агенти“ и на тој начин се надградува до комплетноста. Сепак, комплетноста е не-претставлива.

Делез ја конструира својата дијалектика околу проблемот како да се афирмира продуктивен континуитет преку потрага по комплетноста, додека истовремено одговара на пропозицијата дека континуитетот никогаш не е прашање на идентитети или репрезентации. Со други зборови, ние никогаш не можеме да го претставиме или идентификуваме континуитетот, макар и релативно и на еден отворен преобразувачки начин.¹⁵

Вилијамс указува на релевантноста на релацијата помеѓу идентитетот и настанот, онаако како што оваа релација е разработена од страна на Делез: „Идентитетите се сречаваат во настаните кои варираат во согласност со „драмата“ на повеќекратните сензации и, следствено, интензитети“. (Williams, “Deleuze”).

Конечниот резултат од овие сложени физички и лингвистички движења е појавувањето на специфична *грмайшка* на делото која лоцира из-

The final result of these complex physical and linguistic movements is the emergence of a specific *grammar* of the work that locates a certain voice—makes a difference
between “who is speaking” that becomes irrelevant and “the speaking itself.” Claire Colebrook draws a distinction between the grammar of the Being and the grammar of becoming. At first, she identifies the grammar and logic of subject as tied to certain way of speaking:

The very concept of the subject is tied to a strategy of being and essence, rather than becoming. And this is because the subject is not just a political category or representation but a movement of grammar. The very notion of subject in the grammatical sense, as a being capable of predication, is also tied to a broader notion of grammar whereby political subjects or identities are effected through certain ways of speaking. The concept and logic of the subject as such, then, demand or provokes a movement of thought, a specific temporality and, ultimately, a strategy of reactivist, recognition, and being (rather than becoming).\(^{16}\)

Majoritarianism is affected by becoming-minoritarian and the mere possibilities of becoming-minoritarian shape majoritarianism. There are many restraints that culture imposes on normal subjectivity in the form of biopower and these restraints are mainly suspected and disavowed in becoming. “Becoming here is a means to get ‘outside’, which is perhaps what Deleuze and Guattari meant in their insistence of becoming-woman.”\(^{17}\)

“However, as feminists know, each discourse of feminism is a multiple proliferation of a variety of discourses. Most of these aim to open discussion, investigating the gaps and holes in the discourse of ‘humanity’, essentially ‘manity’ or more correctly ‘majoritanity.’”\(^{18}\)
about negotiating the discursive constitution of subject but it should not be forgotten that discourse is corporeal “because we are enfleshed versions of the speech that constitutes us from culture without and from self-regulation or identification within. [...]In order for there to ever be a potential for actual becoming, the potential of the body we are now must be recognised.”19

**Becoming-subject**

Becoming is an aspiration for change in thinking the material self. Becoming deterritorialises subjectivity, mobilising rather than reifying the way we think self. The familiar territory of subjectivity resonates with sexual territory but more importantly with the familiar territory of how we think our subjectivity.20

Instead of the subordinate strategy of the subject, Colebrook calls for sustained “strategy of becoming.”21 According to Colebrook “the self it effects is not an essence but an event.”22 Thus, she obviously objects to any conceptualisation of the subject as something fixed and given once forever. Furthermore, by following Deleuze she paraphrases his notion of becoming: “before there is a genesis that can be tracked back to an origin or condition, there is a multiple and synchronic stratification and structuring, not something located at a single point but a creation of possible points through the event of lines, striations, and articulations.”23
This notion of multiplicity that always already stratifies the origin seems to be in a direct conflict with the endless quest for the origin of one’s own identity. There is only a locating of multiple selves in the rhizome of becomings. “Every thought is already a tribe.” Becoming, in a Deleuzean sense, is not a process that happens through linear time and a result of dialectically overcoming certain obstacles or contradictions, but it is more about becoming offspring of the event:

Nothing more can be said, and no more has ever been said: to become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event, to become the offspring of one’s own events, and thereby to be reborn, to have one more birth, and to break with one’s carnal birth—to become the offspring of one’s events and not of one’s action is itself produced by the offspring of the event.

This idea of becoming offspring of one’s events and not of one’s action resonates with the Nietzschean concept of eternal return as it is understood by Deleuze in what he has called “the third figure of transmutation” in the process of becoming:

Becoming is no longer opposed to the One (these oppositions being the categories of nihilism). On the contrary, what is affirmed is the One of multiplicity, the Being of becoming... We now see what this third figure is: the play of the eternal return. This return is precisely the Being of becoming, the one of multiplicity, the necessity of chance. Thus we must not make of the eternal return a return of the same.
Subjectively, common sense subsumes under itself the various faculties of the soul, or the differentiated organs of the body, and brings them to bear upon a unity which is capable of saying “I.” One and the same self perceives, imagines, remembers, knows, etc.; one and the same breathes, sleeps, walks, and eats…. Language does not seem possible without this subject which expresses and manifests itself in it, and which says what it does.\(^\text{27}\)

This recalls the logic of Spivak’s notion of subaltern subjects that have special strategies and that sounds slightly different from Butler’s production of subject through subjection to law and through the process of acquitting oneself from the presumed guilt:

To become a “subject” is thus to have been presumed guilty. Then tried and declared innocent. Because this declaration is not a single act but a status incessantly reproduced, to become a “subject” is to be continuously in the process of acquitting oneself of the accusation of guilt.... Yet because this guilt conditions the subject, it constitutes the prehistory of the subjection to the law by which the subject is produced.\(^\text{28}\)

While for Butler the subject internalises the assumed guilt before it is even a subject (the guilt precedes the subject) and is forced to become a subject in this contin-
субјект во овој континуиран процес на отфрлање на вината, Спивак сугерира дека процесот на субјектификација се изведува од субјект кој го мами системот преку употребувањето на сопствени средства и стратегии.

Според Делез, наситишување не е прашање на еволуција, нешто што му се случува секому, туку посебно е прашање на микроолишика:

Настанувањето е ризом, а не класификаторно или генеалошко дрво. Настанувањето се како не е имитирање, или идентификување со нешто; не е ниту регресирање - прогресирање; не е ниту кореспондирање, восставување на релација на кореспонденција; ниту е продуцирање, продуцирање на сродност или продуцирање преку сродност. Настанувањето е глагол со своја сопствена консистентност; тој не сведува на, или води назад до „појавувањето“, „суштествувањето“, „изедначувањето“, или „продуцирањето“.  

Сепак, јас би ја застапувала тезата дека освен неразрешената макрополитика која, според Делез, е непријател на наситишување - не можеме да разправаме за наситишување жена во еден поопшт културен контекст. наситишување може да се случи, исто така, и во макрополитички контекст, но само како акумулација на микро-наситишувања.

На крајот, би сакала да предложам едно друго станување, наситишување-родова-разлика кое е засновано врз Делезовиот поим на комбисибилни наситан. Вишување е секогаш веќе големо и со цел да стане друго, потребно е да биде детерторијализирано. Спротивно, наситишување-родова-разлика симултano ги изискува истите две движења како и наситувањето минорен: едно преку кое субјектот ќе биде изолиран од мнозинството, и другото преку кое тој ќе произлегне од малцинството.

uous process of acquitting, Spivak suggests that process of subjectification is carried on by a subject who tricks the system by using its own means and strategies.

According to Deleuze becoming is not an evolutionary question, something that happens to everybody, but it is rather a question of micropolitics:

Becoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or genealogical tree. Becoming is certainly not imitating, or identifying with something: neither is it regressing-progressing; neither is it corresponding, establishing corresponding relations; neither it is producing, producing a filiation or producing through filiation. Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, “appearing,” “being,” “equalling,” or “producing.”  

However, I want to argue that besides the unresolved macropolitics that according to Deleuze are the enemy of becoming – we can discuss becoming woman in a more general cultural context. Becoming can happen also in a macropolitical context but only as accumulation of micro-becomings.

At the end, I want to propose another becoming, the becoming-gender-difference that is based on Deleuze’s notion of compossible events. Being is always already grand and in order to become the other, it needs to be deterritorialised. In contrast, becoming-gender-difference simultaneously needs the same two movements as becoming minor: one by which the subject will be isolated from majority, and another by which it will rise up from minority.
The difference between the Derridean *différance*, and the Deleuzean conception of expression of difference relies on the concept of *compossibility* that entails a kind of a *disjunctive dialectics*:

The expressed world is made of differential relations and of contiguous singularities. It is formed as a world precisely to the extent that the series which depend on each singularity converge with the series which depend on others. This convergence defines “compossibility” as a rule of a world synthesis. Where the series diverge, another world begins, incompossible with the first. The extraordinary notion of compossibility is thus defined as a continuum of singularities, whereby continuity has the convergence of series as its ideational criterion. It follows that the notion of incompossibility is not reducible to the notion of contradiction.\(^{31}\)

According to Deleuze’s definition of compossibility the relation between events cannot be defined as causal and consequential but events can either co-exist or are incompossible: “Events are never causes of one another, but rather enter the relations of quasi-causality, an unreal ghostly causality, endlessly reappearing in the two senses.”\(^ {32}\)

“Two events are compossible when the series which are organised around their singularities extend in all directions; they are incompossible when the series diverge in vicinity of constitutive singularities.”\(^ {33}\)

The event of *becoming-gender-difference* does not give way to any privileging of *becoming-woman* for the simple reason that instead of appropriation and emphasis given to woman it thinks *becoming* as compossible
events of multiple becomings.

Notes:
7. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


21. Colebrook, 118.

22. Ibid., 132.

23. Ibid.


27. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 89.


30. Ibid., 291.


32. Ibid., 39.

33. Ibid., 196.