1. A Spinozian Intro: The Hubristic Essence of Humanity

By virtue of expression intrinsic to it, Spinozian conatus of self-preservation can be defined as intensive whereas the latter, i.e., intensity, is defined by infinity (Deleuze 1990). In accordance with the immanence that defines it (the conatus of infinity), self-preservation is transgressive or hubristic. Namely, if human “appetite” consists in the necessary tendency toward an infinite power of existence, and if infinity bears the mark of – or gives mark to, i.e., defines – immortality (or godlike existence), we can conclude that human essence is hubristic. It is an inherent tendency of the finite being, always already participating in the Infinity, to endlessly increase its Desire (Spinoza’s “conscious emotion”) for perfection of life, that is, for a life that offers as complete and as undisturbed as possible state of pleasure.

In a Spinozian universe, perfection is achieved within a community of human (and other living) beings.

Wo еден спинозовски универзум, совершенството се остварува во заедница на човечки (и на други живи)
Perfection or the state of total pleasure depends on our constitutive interrelatedness with the others. Imagining the others suffer affects our own wellbeing, our own state of being-in-pleasure, explains Spinoza (E III, 30p). Imagination, according to Spinoza, has a formative role in relation to mind whereas the latter always already integrates emotion (Lloyd 1996: 53-58). Therefore, the human individual wishes to “exclude the existence” – in and through imagination – of whatever affects the others with sadness (Lloyd 1996: 76). Striving toward the “exclusion of existence” of what brings about pain and sadness in one’s life, always already inextricable from the lives of all living beings, is immanent to human essence – immanent to the “appetite” for preserving (in) life (Spinoza E III 29p, 30, 30p).

Consequently, one could infer that opposition to (or critique of) all that corrupts life with negativity is immanent to Spinoza’s conatus (of self-preservation). Concern with the opposition between Good and Bad, positioning oneself in terms of this opposition seem to be constitutive of self-preservation, and vice versa. Critique is at the heart of self-preservation. Revolt seems to stem from the purely experiential, almost pre-linguistic stance of sheer self-preserving, from the mute stance of merely surviving.

Inferring one further implication of this thesis, one might say that the need to maintain life as little as possible corrupt by pain urges the individual to introduce change in society. Namely, in order to be able to increase his/her power of activity, the individual seeks to introduce beneficial, life-increasing change in the organized network of interpersonal relations.
This logic of inference is valid only with reference to the active and conscious emotions, i.e., to desire/s. Passions are passive (Spinoza E III 56). Passions, the in Spinozian sense of the word, are re-active emotions lacking in imagination and reason in order to introduce change (E III 49p, 56, 58). Passive emotions are not desires for any sort of change except re-active reversals – products of resentment. In fact, in a Spinozian universe, passions are no desires at all. Desire, in the Spinozian sense of the word, is a conscious and active emotion (Spinoza E III 9, 49, 49p, 58p, 1def. 1def.exp., “General Definition of the Emotions”). Passions are contrary to active emotions (Spinoza E IV 23, 23p, 24, 24p, 33, 33p, et alibi). They are the product of being passively subjected to external inflictions of either pleasure or pain (E III 57p, General Definition of the Emotions).
добро/зло, таа не постои сама по себе. Доброто и злото се и онака секогаш односно утврдени.

Затоа, отсега под „добро“ ќе го подразбираш она за што со сигурност знаеме дека е средство со кое повеќе ќе се доближиме до оној вид човечка природа што сме си го зацртале; под „лошо“ ќе го подразбираш она за што со сигурност знаеме дека ни пречи да се доближиме до споменатиот вид (Spinoza E IV Preface).

Meѓу тоа, има две нешта за кои Спиноза врди дека се добри или лоши сами по себе:

Задоволството, само по себе, не е лошо, ами е добро. Доказ: задоволството е чувство благодарение на кое телесната моќ за дејство се зголемува или се потпомага; болката е чувство поради кое телесната моќ за дејство се смалува или проверчува, па затоа задоволството е добро само по себе, итн, Q.E.D. (E IV, 41)

Подложени на страстите (E IV, 4c), на реактивните чувства на пасивност (E III, def.3nb) кои исходуваат со смалена моќ на постоенje, конечните човечки суштиства можат да бидат извор и на злото и на лошото (на сето она што е неблаготворно за нашето постоенje и за постоенето на ближниот). Второво може да содржи потенцијал да го претвори светов во постоенje според една хобсовска визија (Spinoza E IV 34, 34p, 34n). Затоа, Спиноза тврди дека е потребен облик на контрола, заснован врз разумот (E IV, 35, 35p, 35c1, 35c2, 35n).

Обликов што ја пртга можноста од хаотичен и насилен свет со кој ќе владеат напливи страст, според Спиноза, е Државата. Институционално наметнатите норми и вредности, како и заканите со казна, заедно со средствата за спроведување, се „изум“ на умереноста, на контролата не врз можниот вишок од животен интензитет – зашто нема таква опасност – туку

In what follows, then, I shall mean by “good” that, which we certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by “bad,” that which we certainly know to be hindrance to us in approaching the said type. (Spinoza E IV Preface)

However, there are two things that Spinoza claims are good and bad per se:

Pleasure in itself is not bad but good: contrariwise, pain in itself is bad. Proof. – Pleasure is emotion, whereby the body’s power of activity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby the body’s power of activity is diminished or checked, therefore pleasure in itself is good, &c. Q.E.D. (E IV, 41)

Being subjects to passions (E IV, 4c), to the re-active emotions of passivity (E III, def.3nb) resulting in a lessened power of existence, finite beings of mankind can be the source of evil or bad (all that which is not beneficial to our own or our neighbor’s being). The latter may contain potentiality for a world to come according to the Hobbesian vision (Spinoza E IV 34, 34p, 34n). Hence a Form-of-Control is required, based on reason, claims Spinoza (E IV, 35, 35p, 35c1, 35c2, 35n).

The Form that suspends the possibility of a chaotic, violent world ruled by fluxes of passion, in Spinoza’s view, is the State (E IV, 37 n2). Institutionally imposed norms, values as well as threats of punishment, accompanied by means of enforcement are the “invention” of moderation, of control over the possibility not of excess of intensity of life – since no such danger exists – but of passions.
Accordingly, Spinoza calls upon respecting the laws of the State and invokes the necessity of normalization (E IV, 37, 40).

Still, I would argue, this is a formal claim. In other words, Spinoza insists on the necessity of a form of control over the passions of humanity, and that form is called a “State.” Yet, there is no reason to think that the latter implies that each state is – or that the concrete state of the concrete epoch in which Spinoza lived was – ideal. Spinoza’s ethic is “ordine geometrico demonstrata.” His discourse is abstract and the terminology is formal (or generic) and so is the claim about the State (just as all the other statements referring to other instances of the palpably societal human life). His advocating respect for the “State” is simply arguing for the structural or formal necessity of the instance of the Law (E IV, 37 n2, E IV, 40) and/or for an organized society of enforced laws.

In this respect, proposition 40 of the Part IV of his Ethics could be read in a double sense, as both a formal enunciation about the necessity of Law that introduces and sustains harmony among individuals and a potentially revolutionary call:

Whatsoever conduces to man’s social life, or causes men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad.

If a State is organized in a way which introduces a considerable lack of harmony, disproportion of pleasure and pain, an asymmetric extent of pain to a part of it causing imbalance and, hence, pain to the entire structure of society – then, one is called upon to re-evaluate all
2. Sheer Life: Political Sovereignty in a Pre-Linguistic World

In *Homo Sacer* (1998), Giorgio Agamben proposes a genealogy of the concept of political sovereignty, namely of the one pertaining to the European civilization. Beginning with Roman Antiquity, Agamben’s genealogical account of the European cultural invention of political sovereignty enables a discovery which is of critical importance for the argument we are making here. We will attempt to demonstrate that Agamben’s genealogy of the notion of political sovereignty unravels the immanently pre-discursive grounding of the latter. Namely, his analysis, more specifically in *Homo Sacer*, shows that sovereignty is based upon the founding act of sacrifice of “bare life.” This is the primal sacrificial institution which constitutes initialization into and of (European) civilization. Life itself, sheer life defined by its physicality and voiceless labor of staying-in-life, has to be sacrificially killed in order to be transformed into an *eikon*, into an image and a linguistic sign, in order to constitute a political universe.

In every case, sacred life cannot dwell in the city of men: for the surviving devotee, the imaginary funeral functions as a vicarious fulfillment of the consecration that gives the individual back to normal life; for the emperor, the double funeral makes it possible to fasten onto the sacred life, which must be gathered and divinized in the apotheosis; for *homo sacer*, finally, we are confronted with a residual and irreducible bare life, which must be excluded and exposed to a death that no rite and no sacrifice can redeem. (Agamben 1998: 100).
Indeed the “irreducible bare life which must be excluded and exposed to death” cannot be redeemed by any rite or sacrifice. Bare life is precisely what has been sacrificed in the name of the Symbolic. It is the necessary subject to sacrifice so that “the World” is established. The “bare life” of a homo sacer or of the medieval king is the sacrificial animal, the organism, the body that ought to be sacrificed in order for the political universe to come into being. It is the Real that must be annihilated for the Sign to arrive in its place. In order for the Signifier-of-Sovereignty to be produced, the bare life of the political subject that embodies the Sovereignty has to be sacrificed: it may be the embodied life of a king or of the citizen/s (= “the nation”). As Agamben shows, from Roman Antiquity – and, referring to the institution of pharmakon, I would say from the Greek Antiquity – to the globalized European invention of the modern nation-state, political sovereignty is realized only on the basis of derealization of the embodied life of its subjects. Life as body, life as the pulsating bloody mess that the human animal’s organism is has to be annulled for in that void left behind by the departing Real the Signifier of Sovereignty to emerge. The latter is the Signifier that will enable the transformation of bare Life into pure (political) Meaning. In order for human life to possess meaning, life at its most radical – as bare life or nothing-but-life – must be effaced. The process of effacement, however, always already fails to be executed without a remainder. The remainder that always eludes the process of signification is bare life – precisely that which should have been saturated with meaning in the first place.
The political (of the European Civilization) has been but an incessant process of signification of life in its radical immanence (life-in-its-aspect-of the Real) – an endless process of an always already failed process of taming the uncanny of Life by way of Meaning. Today, it is clear that the Political is about controlling, exploiting – transcending the “biological.”

In Antiquity, both Roman and Greek, it has been life in its bareness – as the body, the animal, or the “biological” – that had to be sacrificed (sacrificially killed) for the political order to emerge. In Ancient Greece, the purpose of the blood sacrifice, the hierieia (ἱερεία) is precisely the maintenance of the polis. It is to the Olympic gods that the hierieia are offered (Burkert 1983, passim; Burkert 1977, passim). And the Olympic gods represent, install and maintain order. The enagisma (ἐναγίσμα), on the

Politichkoto (vo evropskata civilizaciija) bilo samo nezapiroviv proces na signifikacija na zivotot vosvojata koroteninamantnost (zivoteto negoviot aspekt na Realnoto) – brekran proces na vecie i onaka neuspevnno krotenje na Zlovesnoto vo Zivototot preku Znacheneto. Denes e jasno deka vo sidrpeteto na Politichkoto se kontrolyata i eksploatacijata – transendiranaieno na „biolozkoto“.

Fakt e deka eudna ista afrmiracija na goliot zivot, vo burjoseckoto opshhestvo, vodi do nadrednost na privatnoto nad javnoto i na poedinchnite slobodi nad kolektivnite dolzhnosti, dodeka, pak, vo totalitaritnite dzhavvi, stanuva reshavacki politichki kriterium i tipichno podracej na suverenite odluki. I samo blagodarenie na toa da bioloziat polo zivot i negovite potrebi stanele politichki presuden fakt, vozmozhno e da se sfragat inaku nefatligavata brzina so koja parlamentarnite demokratii vo dvasestiot vek uspeja da stanat totalitarini dzhavvi i podednakvo nefatligavata brzina so koja ovowekovnite totalitarini dzhavvi uspeja, rechihi bez zausto, da se preobratat vo parlamentarni demokratii. Vo obata slucaji, tie preobrazbi nastanale vo kontekst kadve veye od pooddama politikata se pretvorila vo biopolitika i vo koj edinstvenoto vistinsko prashanje chto trebalo da se razreshi bilo koj oblik na ustrojstvo najmnogo bi i odgovaral na zadatchata da se obezbendi nega, kontrola i koristeone na suhitot zivot. (Homo Sacer 121-122)

Vo drvenata dob, i vo rimskata i vo grckata, tokmu zivotot vo svojata sushtnost – kako plotta, zivotnoto ili „bioloziat“ – moralassegertwva (dasejrtwva so ubistvo) za da se pojavi politichkiot porok. Vo drvena Gricia, krvnogoojkrtwva, xiperiata (ενάγισμα), go imalo za cel tokmu krepneneto na polisoi. Tokmu na olimpskite bogovi im se prinsewval te xiperi (Burkert 1983, passim; Burkert 1977, passim). A olimpskite bogovi go pretstavuval,
vostolichuvale и крепеле поредокот. Од друга страна, 
енагисма (енагисма), одноосно принесувањето вино, 
мед, вода, сушен овошје и летина, секогаш им било 
наменето на мртвите и на адските божества (Алексиу 2002: 9-10, 16, 32; Мулинер 1950: 209, 210, 73, 111, 80-
81, 109). Хиереиа секогаш се сведува на холокаустос 
(холокаустос) – палење на жртвата, на мртвото 
животно кое, во митологијата, може да биде и човек. 
Тоа е чиста, незагадена и незагадувачка жртва – таа 
ги носи светлината и разумот, логосот и полисот. Тоа 
е жртва на поништување, збришување, неплосување 
на крвавиот дармар од биолошки живот. Врз одарот 
на чистото значење што останува по сагорувањето на 
жртвено убиениот овоплотен живот, се гради Логосот 

The enagisma, the offerings in liquids and food to the 
dead and to the gods of death, normally performed by 
women is related to burial and mourning rituals that are 
by definition related to pollution and defilement (Alexiou 2002: 10). The term enagisma (енагисма) is derived 
from the word agos (агос) which means defilement that 
is owe-provoking, a negative taboo, moral pollution that 
is the result of crime (Liddell-Scott, 1968; Parker 1983: 
5, 18, 322-23). The opposite meaning contained in the 
word hagnos (агнос) – sacred and pure – is derived from 
the word agos (агос); and so is enagisma, a word which 
means moral, god-observing practice of due sacrifice to 
the (chthonic) divine powers (Mouliner 1950: 9, 16).

Clearly there is ambivalence in the notion of sacred which 
is contained precisely in the word hagnos (агнос). The 
ambivalence in question consists in the fact that hagnos 
(агнос) is derived from the agos (агос) or hagos 
(агос) which refers to a specific type of defilement and 
transgression. The latter relates to being in touch with 
a dead body or being in touch with those affected by
chiј dom imalo rojba, so skvernavenеtо hramovi и 
krešenеto na големите табу какородосквернавенето, 
ubistvoto и ubivavanеto na sopstvenite rodители. So 
drugi zborovi, valkaњето vo (х)agos se povzruva so 
prestantuvanеto na granicite што ja definiraat 
цивилизацијата, со прегазувањето на цртите кои го 
исключуваat seto она што ги destabilizira разумот 
i poredokot (т.e. воспоставениата normalnost).

(X)agos, вушност, se однесува на престапувањето на 
granicите на разумот, на Zakonot, на полупроѕирното 
Трансцендентно – зачекорувањето отде прагот на 
Значењето и на Поредокот. Хаос навира кога ke se 
pomatat granicite koи gi garantira priдржувањето 
koj tabucta. Do deсtabiliziraњe на granicite што 
go krepat Zakonot i Simbolнот Portedok doага 
поради близината или допирот со “биолошкото“ 
– ili kako rezultat na Stvarното – на Животот во 
погребни, веченални и родилни прилики. Обредите 
за belежење и разбирање на trite видови настани, 
odnosno postapkite na vpsiшувањe vo Simbolнотo, 
ja imaat rechis iistata struktura i terminologija 
za imeнувањe на деловите на svojata struktura 
(Rehm 1994: 22ff). Na primer, zborot kêdeia значи 
pregreb и здружување (низ брак) и родителство, 
dodeka kêdeuô значи средување невеста или мртовец, 
no i skluchuvanja sojuz preku brak (Alexiou 2002: 
10). Pogrebot, venchavkata i ragaњetо se priгоди na 
neposredna sredba so она што sekogash veke i bega na 
simbolizациjата – што raga i stavropochit i grozeњe, 
што e na granicatata na nasilstvoto i kravata 
brutalnost на poчиnuването и окончувањетo живот.

Она што ne може da se simbolizira e toa што 
непосредно учествува во Зловесното, во Реалното; 
Pogledot kon toj “Свет отде замислата (imaginatio),“ 
vo koj nemato Закон, nitu Знак, nitu Eikon, prediz-
vikuva paraliziracka stavropochit. Toa e стоjaлиш-
mourning, to giving birth or being in touch with members of a household where a birth took place, to violating temples and to braking of the great taboos of incest, murder or parricide. In other words, the defilement of (h)agos is related to the transgression of the boundaries that define civilization, stepping across the lines of exclusion of everything that destabilizes sense and order (i.e., the established normality).

(H)agos is, in fact, about transgressing the boundaries of reason, of Law, of the translucent Transcendental – stepping across the threshold of Meaning and Order. Chaos is provoked by the blurring of boundaries that are guaranteed by the observance of taboos. Destabilization of the boundaries that ground the Law and the Symbolic Order takes place as the result of closeness to or being in touch with the “biological” – or of the Real – of Life in occasions of funeral, wedding and birth. The rites – i.e., the practices of inscription into the Symbolic – of marking and making sense of the three types of events have virtually the same structure and terminology to name the components of the structure (Rehm 1994: 22ff). For example, the word kêdeia means both funeral and alliance (through marriage) and parenthood, whereas kêdeuô means to tend a bride or a corpse but also to establish an alliance through marriage (Alexiou 2002: 10). Funeral, wedding and birth are instances of direct encounter with that which always already escapes symbolization – which provokes owe and disgust at the same time, which is on the border of violence and the bloody brutality of beginning and end of life.

The un-symbolizable is that which participates directly in the Uncanny, in the Real; the Glance at this “World-beyond-Imagination,” in which there is no Language, no Sign or Eikon, inspires a paralyzing owe. It is that stance of staring into the bare eye of full reality. It is the blinding
тето од каде човек се всира право во очите на суштата стварност. Тоа е заслепувачкиот поглед во Реалното – созорба во која сигнификацијата е попуста, идапос што може да го населат само божества. Ете зошто во грчкото сликарство (на вази) Дионис или Горгона или човек лишен од разум (на пр. некој пијан) секогаш се сликаат ан-фас, додека нормалното прикажување е во профил (Vernant 1990; Vernant 1995). Ова за смртниците недостоично царство и подрачје кое никогаш не го ограела светлината на разумот, ова место-немесесто, во грчката религија обично е место на мртвите, на хтонските богови и на богот на престапот, Дионис. И токму на тие божествени сили им се присусуваат enagismata, додека крвните жртви, т.е. hieriea си се резервирани за олимпските богови. И вториве со справопочит се соочуваат со овој дел на божественото. Средиштето на древна Грција, како што не потсетува Буркер, е каменот Омфал во Делфи, а тоа е место на либациите, т.е. на присусување enagismata (Burkert 1977: 125).

Agamben is puzzled by the double sense of the notion of “sacer” in the case of the Roman religious-political institution of “homo sacer” (Agamben 1998: 71-74). Homo sacer is a man marked by the pollution of transgressing the boundaries of humanity as stipulated by the divine authority: through committing a crime that implies a violation of a taboo (such as a murder), he has stepped into a territory that can only belong to the gods. He is defiled by the sacred that is the inaccessible, the unutterable and the unthinkable. Transgression of the boundaries of human and defilement by coming into contact with the realm of the divine is the highest form of crime and pollution, since the sacred is the adyton or abaton, the inaccessible, and the arrheton, the unutterable (Burkert 1977: 403). The one who acquires the status of “homo sacer” has been polluted by the crime of stepping into the agos – into the topos beyond reason, the impossible
agos-от – во topos-от отдал разумот, невозможното место отдал Јазикот, зашто сторил неизустлив злостор и чин што им припаа само на бесмртните. Со други зборови, стапнал во царството на светите.

Доаѓањето во забранетиот непосреден допир – т.е. преку злостор – со светото предизвикува дестабилизација на границите меѓу смртното и бесмртното. Чудото на поматување на границите двата света само по себе е запрепастуваачка пројава на светото (односно, на неговото навлегување во светот на смртните). Ваквата конкретна пројава на светото се вика agos. Enagisma е збор изведен од agos. Да се потсетиме, се однесува на обредното присување дарови на хтонските богови и на мртвите. Покрај либациите што традиционално им се присуваале на мртвите и на боговите поврзани со смрт и со воскреснувањето, на некои хтонски богови им се присуваале и други дарови. На пример, на крстопатите во Атина жените и оставале на Хеката разно-разен смет од дома (Alexiou 2002: 16). Она што било на границата меѓу „чистото“ и „валканото“, меѓу уредното и неуредното, чие изземање претставувало чин на разграничување на умното и заумното, жените й го присуваале како enagisma на божицата на црните врнежи - Хеката. Либациите, или enagismata, за мртвите и за хтонските божества биле обредно-јружеви чиноведејствија за кои по дефиниција биле задолжени жените, додека крвните жртви на олимпските богови им ги присуваале исключиво мажи (Burkert 1983, Parker 1983, Alexiou 2002).

Agos-от се поврзува со бездната на божественото – со црната жама на немислимото што ги голта смртните. Agos е местото каде боговите логосфери од Олимп застануваат со стравопочит; во Ајсхилова Orestiја се заборува збискува тврдка што предолимписките божества ја имале над престапувањето на agos-от, place beyond Language, since he/she has committed an unutterable crime and an act permitted only to the immortals. In other words, he/she has stepped into the territory of the sacred.

Coming into the prohibited direct contact – i.e., through crime – with the sacred provokes destabilization of the boundaries between mortal and immortal. The marvel of blurring the boundaries between the two worlds is in itself an owe-provoking manifestation of the sacred (that is, its incursion into the world of the mortals). This sort of instantiation of the sacred is called agos. Enagisma is a term derived from agos. Let us remind ourselves, it refers to a ritual offering consecrated to the chthonic gods and to the dead. Apart from the libations traditionally offered to the dead and to the gods related to death and resurrection, to some chthonic gods other offerings were submitted as well. For example, at the crossroads of Athens women left sweepings from the house of all sorts of refuse as to Hekate (Alexiou 2002: 16). That which lies at the border between “clean” and “dirty,” between orderly and disorderly, that whose exclusion represents an act of delineation between sense and beyond-sense is what women used to submit as enagisma to the goddess of black magic – Hekate. Libations or enagismata to the dead and to the chthonic divinities were acts of ritual sacrifice which were by definition performed by women, whereas the blood sacrifice offered to the Olympians was performed by men exclusively (Burkert 1983, Parker 1983, Alexiou 2002).

The agos relates to the abyss of the divine – to that black hole of the unthinkable that devours the mortals. Agos is the point at which even the logos-bringing gods of Olympus stop in owe; Aeschylus’ Orestia speaks about the exclusive authority the pre-Olympic divinities had over transgressions of agos such as e.g. matricide (and...
of the political struggle of the Olympians to gain a share of this authority). Through committing a murder, incest or a parricide one does not become a mere criminal, one becomes an incarnation of defilement beyond words. *Homo sacer* is somebody defiled by *agos*. He is polluted. Hence he cannot be offered as a sacrifice to the gods. On the other hand, he is sacred: he bears the traces of *agos* upon himself; moreover, he has become himself the trace of it.

Murdering a *homo sacer* is beyond punishment because the one who would kill a sacred person would himself already be polluted by the *agos*. But also because his life on the earth is a bare life, a human life stripped of humanity. His soul has been invaded by the *agos*. It has undergone a monstrous transformation – it is no longer a human psyche. Through the violation of the sacred, just like Oedipus in Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus*, the *homo sacer* has already been consecrated to the gods; the sacred he has come to bear as a constitutive part of himself is the *agos*. Therefore, he cannot be subject to *hierieia*, to a blood sacrifice offered to the Olympians. As a living *agos* among the living, as the instantiation of that-which-is-beyond-human-reason wandering under the sun that illuminates the polis, he has no other role than to be the flux (an *enagisma*) of dehumanized human suffering offered to the gods. Through the act of consecration of the *agos*, the transgressor has been transformed into a redeemer, a cure of human souls – a *pharmakon* (Sophocles O.C. 21:12).

Apart from the role of a *pharmakon* invaded by *agos*, *homo sacer* is a wounded body and a wounded soul stripped of human form. He is a wandering, wounded and vulnerable bare life devoid of humanity.
3. Vulnerability Preconditioning Humanity

In Precarious Life (2006) and in Undoing Gender (2004), Judith Butler tackles the question of the mute suffering of the ones whose lives, whose “loves and losses” have been rendered “unreal” (Butler 2004: 27; 2006: 36). The silent suffering and the ensuing sense of derealization is the result of the fact that these are people precluded from “universally” legible mediation of their experiences. They do not have access to the linguistic means of the globally dominant discourses that would render their personal narratives universally communicable. These human losses have suffered derealization by the dominant discourses within which they do not succeed to gain meaning, claims Butler (2004: 25, 27). The loves and the losses for which it remains impossible to provide articulation within the universally communicable discourses are the loves and losses of the not-completely-universally-human experiences, these are anomalous lives of love and suffering (cf. Butler 2006: 33-34); the latter represents a topos inhabited by a variety of embodied lives that disrupt and elude what institutes itself as the Normal, a diverse group of “abnormal” embodied agencies that include queer people as well as the countless and nameless Palestinian victims (Butler 2006: 35-36).

The structural laws of the “intelligible discourses” render these losses meaningless, since they cannot be named – and, hence, ascribed value – in a legible way of the universally (i.e., globally) dominant discourses, that is, the discourses of normality. The “intelligible” is that which is thought and thinkable according to the globally dominant model of Normativity. This means that the “intelligible” and the “normal” can also be “sensitive to the
дека „разбирувото“ и „нормалното“ можат да бидат и „чувствителни за културната разлика“ бидејќи доминантната норма може да реши во себе да го интегрира „почитувањето на различните“. Па сепак, тагата за загинатите Палестинци не може да се именува зашто она што зборуваат од стојалиштето на доминантните дискурси, од име на универсално разбирувото не можа да ги именуваат жртвите. Звукот на тие имиња е непрепознатлив, неразговорен – тоа се имиња што „човек ги заборава“, тие имиња им се _тешки_ за изговарање на онее што можат да зборуваат од именито на сите нас. Тешко дека тоа се „стварни имиња“.

Чувството на живеење живот лишен од значење дури и во неговите крајно екстатични и драматични мигови, чувството на отсушност од „она што има смисла“, дури и кога човек е на врвот од своето животно остварување или во јамата на најтучниот пад во животот, е искусно на лишениот од стварност. Безначајноста е нестварна во неизбежно знаковно устроената стварност. Овие загуби и јадови не се претставени, за нив не се зборува, па, вели Батлер, невозможно е јавно да се оплакуваат (Butler 2006: 37-39) – не се вписани во колективниот наратив. Немаат своето место во замисливата стварност. Ним не им е дозволен пристап до стварноста што може да се замисли и за која может да се зборува. Со нивното неименување, станале нестварни. Угнетувањето не е само политичко. Во тој миг веќе станува онтолошко.

За добие пристап до стварноста, човек мора да добие пристап до „унiversalno“ (доминантно и нормативно) читливите дискурси. Изустувањето на сопствената болка, на сопствениот јад и на сопствената загуба мора да се добие со читливост во рамките на постојните нормални/нормативни cultural difference” since the dominant norm can decide to integrate within itself “the respect for difference.” Still the grief for the killed Palestinians _cannot be named_ because the ones who speak from the instance of the dominant discourses, on behalf of the universally understandable _cannot name_ the victims. The sound of these names is unrecognizable, indiscernible – these are names that “one forgets,” these names are difficult (hard) to pronounce by those who can speak on behalf of all of us. These are hardly “real names.”

The sense of living a life that is deprived of meaning even in its most ecstatic and most dramatic moments, of being absent from “What-Makes-Sense” even when one is at the peak of a lifetime accomplishment or in the pit of a life’s most serious downfall is an experience of being deprived of reality. Meaningless is unreal in the inescapably eikonically constituted reality. These losses and grief are not represented, they are not talked of, and it is impossible to publicly mourn them, claims (Butler 2006: 37-39) – they are not inscribed into the collective narrative. They have no place in the imaginable reality. They are banned access from the reality that can be imagined and talked of. By not naming them they have been rendered unreal. The oppression is not only political. At this point it becomes ontological.

In order to gain access to reality one ought to gain access to the “universally” (dominantly and normatively) legible discourses. One’s voicing about one’s pain, grief and loss ought to acquire legibility within the existing normal/normative discourses in order render meaningful and legitimize one’s dissonant (“subaltern”) narrative.
дискурси за да го вдахне со смисла и легитимитет сопствениот дисонантен („субалтерен“) наратив.

Во поглавјето со наслов „Насилство, оплакување, политика“ од _Несигурен живот_, Џудит Батлер пишува:

Па кога велиме дека секое дете секако е ранливо, јасно е дека тоа е точно; но, точно е, делумно, зашто изустувањето го носи токму признанието за слабоста и со тоа ја покажува важноста на самото признание [...] Оваа рамка, благодарение на која нормите и сакаме да се конституираат на ранливоста како предуслов за „човечкото“, е важна токму поради таа причина, имено, зашто ни требаат тие норми и такаме да постојат, зашто се бориме да се воспостават и го цениме нивното трајно и проширено дејство (Butler 2006: 43).

Признанието _секогаш веке_ е операција на Јазикот: тоа е операција на _еикон_ои, на знакот (визуелниот или вербалниот/текстуалниот). Тоа е резултат од означувањето со кое се доделува знак. Според ци-тираниот пасус, нечија ранливост и нечија рана, неговата тага и неговата загуба мора да добијат пристап до широко и претежно читливите дискурси за да добијат легитимитет да се сметаат за такви. Впрочем, за да го добие статусот на ранливо битие, човек мора да го преведе сопствената ранливост на јазик што го говорат оните што го конституираат полето на стварноста – т.е. она што се _признава_ како стварност која е (нормативниот) Свет на нормалноста. Со други зборови, стварноста се конституира врз чин на признание. Тоа е поетата што Батлер јасно ја изнесува во цитириран пасус.

Но, во истиот пасус се вели и нешто друго што особено би сакала да го истражам. Тоа е исказ кој е видливо ирелевантен за тезата што ја изнесува

In the Chapter titled “Violence, Mourning, Politics” of _Precarious Life_, Judith Butler writes:

So when we say that every infant is surely vulnerable, that is clearly true; but it is true, in part, precisely because our utterance enacts the very recognition of vulnerability and so shows the importance of recognition itself [...] This framework, by which norms of recognition are essential to the constitution of vulnerability as a precondition of the “human,” is important precisely for this reason, namely, that we need and want those norms to be in place, that we struggle for their establishment, and that we value their continuing and expanded operation. (2006: 43)

Recognition is _always already_ an operation of Language: it is an operation of the eikon, of the sign (visual or verbal/textual). It is the result of signification assigning significance. According to the quoted paragraph, one’s vulnerability and one’s wound, one’s grief and loss ought to gain access into the widely and dominantly legible discourse/s in order to obtain legitimacy to be considered as such. In fact, in order to acquire the status of a vulnerable being one has to translate one’s own vulnerability into a language that is spoken by those who constitute the field of reality – i.e., what is _recognized_ as reality which is the (Normative) World of Normality.

In other words, reality is constituted upon an act of recognition. This is a point that Butler clearly makes in the paragraph just quoted.

Yet, there is another enunciation present in the cited paragraph that I am particularly interested in exploring. It is a statement which is obviously irrelevant for the
Bytler, no vredi da se razgleda zaredno poentata što se trudam da ja dokazam tuka. Na početkom od citata ne se upućuje na nešto što je polnoa za zdravorazumsku čišćenju vistina, t.s. nešto što se „podrazbiro“. Tokmu toa što „se podrazbiro i zatoa ne vredi ni da se razgleda teorijski“ go nametiiva pravaņeto kako ta podrazbirovost se vostolicuva, legitimira i stabilizira (no i se destabilizira). Podrazbirovata vistina što ja naveduva Bytler e следнава: „pa koga velime deka sekoe deke sekako e ranliivo, jašno e deka toa e točno“. A ponatamu veli: „toco e, delumno, tokmu zašto izustuvaņeto go nosi tokmu priznanieto za slabostia i so toa ja pokazuva vajnosta na samoto priznanie“.

Znachi, „jašno e deka e točno“. Izgleda tolk se podrazbira što se zaslužuva teorijski preispituvanje. No, „delumno“ e točno i poradi zasilenoto priznanje преку јазикот. Izgleda deka, vo nasava dobа na postmodernitet, toa „delumno“ vezden bilo povажno ili povake zasluživalo političko-teorijsko ispitivaje otkolku ona „jašno deka e točno“. Toa „jašno deka e točno“, ili „se podrazbira“, dobilo status na zdravorazumskа pretpostavka koja postoi vo moralnата grafa na subjektot što teoretiizira i negovata vistinitost se garantira i apofatichki se (de)legitimira od strana na moralniot subjekt na teoretiiziraņeto. Na toj начин, zdravorazumskата vistina stanuva „неподложна на teoretiiziraņе“. Meѓutoа, ова отсуство na priznanje za teoriskата merodavnost za edна diskurzivna pojava koja formativno učestvuva vo diskursite što se pretmet na teoretiiziraņeto e mošine rečito. Zdravorazumskoto „jašno točno“ e vajen element od eden argument, toa e iskaz (t.e. diskurzivna kategoriјa), a sepak si ostanuva diskurzivno irelevantno ili попро teoriski

So it is “clearly true.” It seems so self-evident that it does not deserve theoretical interrogation. “In part,” however, it is true also because of the enactment of recognition through language. It seems that, in our age of post-modernity, this “in part” has always been more important or more worthwhile politico-theoretical exploration than the “clearly true.” The “clearly true,” the “goes without saying” has been assigned the status of a commonsensical presupposition, residing within the realm of the moral constitution of the theorizing subject and its truthfulness is guaranteed and apofatically (de)legitimized by the moral subject of theorizing. In this way, the commonsensical truth is rendered “untheorizable.” However, this absence of recognition of theoretical relevance to a discursive phenomenon that formatively participates in the discourses that are subject to theorizing is telling. The commonsensical “clearly true” constitutes an important element of an argument, it is a statement (i.e., a discursive category), and yet it remains discursively irrelevant, or rather, theoretically insignificant. It is utterly absent from the domain of contemporary post-structuralist theory.
The commonsensical self-evidence does not receive the recognition of relevance in a way that would produce a theoretical narrative (of it). It is a form of discourse that gains no recognition by and within theory. It is theoretically unrecognizable, and illegible. Within the horizon of theoretical reality today, it is de-realized. The commonsensical “clearly true” is always and by definition absent from the political theory of the so-called post-modern era. It is theoretically illegible. It is outside the theoretical discourses on subjection and political subjectivity that situate themselves beyond modernity in both the temporal and epistemic sense. It has no access to the theoretical recognized and recognizable reality, or it does not have the status of a theoretical real.

I would like to tackle this problem of theoretical de-realization, and in this respect, attempt to interrogate the contents of that “clearly true” as something that may have relevance to a theoretical investigation into the theme of the political subject formation and its aspects of responsibility and solidarity. What seems to be “clearly true,” according to the cited passage by Butler, is not only the mere physical fact about children’s vulnerability, but also that vulnerability means something, contains a certain signification, that it is a function of a discursive structure. Evidently, it is the discursive, linguistic rendition of vulnerability that needs to be recognized in order to gain reality. What needs to be recognized in order to be realized is “what it means to be vulnerable” and not the mere fact of physical vulnerability itself. The bare fact of vulnerability devoid of meaning (language) is not what preconditions humanity. The discursive category of vulnerability, the sign and signification that
“vulnerability” represents is what needs recognition in order to precondition the “human.” This is my proposition for summarization of Butler’s main argument in the chapter “Violence, Mourning, Politics” of Precarious Life.

Building on this discourse advanced by Butler, I would like to take the discussion a step further and raise the question of whether bare life itself, that pre-discursive phenomenon of life exposed to the threat of violence can have a political meaning and/or value. Can we attribute political and ethical value to life and vulnerability of life prior to its attaining the status of a sign/signifier, prior to acquiring a meaning, prior to becoming “what life and vulnerability means”?

The Spinozian initiation of this article could show us that sheer life, the Being-as-Nature reduced to its determination-in-the-last-instance (Laruelle 2000: 10) that is the mute labor of self-preservation can contain the foundation of the ethical constitution of the self. Let us recall that in Spinoza’s Ethics pain and pleasure appear as the names of a decreased and an increased level of “presence of life,” respectively (E IV, 41). Let us recall that according to Spinoza the pain that is suffered by others always already acquires presence in our personal life since it inevitably appears on the cognitive level of our existence (E III, 30p). We know of somebody’s state of pain, and by knowing of it we are invaded by it. Because one cannot ever abstract oneself from one’s human – as well as non-human – surroundings, because one is always already inextricably constituted by all that which participates in the overall natura naturans (Deleuze...
Adequate ideas are in service of expressing presence of life which represents a link of uninterrupted continuity between the bodily and the mental (II 13n). It is apparent that in Spinoza’s Ethics it is the body which possesses the status of the determination in the last instance and the identity in the last instance of (individual) life: the “adequate ideas,” and the active emotions that are the product of Reason, are adequate inasmuch as they contribute to a higher power of activity or “presence of life.” The locus par excellence of experiencing and/or of expressing presence of life is but the body. Since the mind and the ideas are determined in the last instance by the body and represent nothing but its “modifications” (Spinoza II 13, 13p). Moreover:

Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as it actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but (I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. (Spinoza II 13p)
of the state of an ever increased experience of pleasure (taking place through the body), whereas the latter is the expression of the increased power of activity or intensity of life (Spinoza E 3 11, 11p, 11n, 15p, 20, 37p).

Expounding on these ideas, or perhaps merely reformulating statements that can be found in the text of Spinoza’s Ethics itself, I would like to propose a hypothesis about “the Organic” (about “Life”) as the determination-in-the-last-instance of political responsibility. The latter will be conceived also as the kernel of the “ethical” or the origin and the immanent law of the “care of the Other.” Spinoza’s inference about the immanence of the ethical is based on his “selfish premise” that one does not wish the harm of the other simply because, by virtue of being aware of it (imagining it), one is him/herself affected by it as well. However, there is another premise from which the inference about the ethical as imbedded in the conatus of self-preservation or of preserving (in) life departs. It is the Spinozian thesis about the individual’s constitutive interrelatedness with and inextricability from the rest of the World (=Nature). The essence of the individual is but an expression of and participation in the attributes of God or Nature. Individualism in the sense of self’s radical autonomy is impossible in the Spinozian con-text: one does not have to “invent” ways of and reasons for the Self’s desire to reach the other, to establish a relation of care. The “care of the Other” is immanent to Life, to any individual’s life, as the Other is immanently present in the life of any individual self.
for ethical acting, let us consider the possibility that Life in its pre-linguistic sense of the Conatus, life in its aspect of ceaseless auto-regeneration, is the origin of ethical and political responsibility. How can the pre-discursive be the origin of discursivity \textit{par excellence} (the Political is) immanently containing the laws of its constitution? What makes this heterogeneity of origin and the identity-in-the-last instance of the Political plausible? Before tackling these questions let us investigate whether the pre-discursive source of the ethical can be identified as the experienced (or, putting it in Spinozian vein, legitimized through body) interconnectedness with the World. Or whether it can and should be determined in its last instance as something else. At this point I would like to revisit and reinvestigate Butler's thesis about vulnerability as that “precondition of the human.”

In her pursuit for that which is the foundation of human solidarity, of the human rights, of political and ontological equality, of human equality, of the Care-for-the-Other, Judith Butler raises the questions of the “precondition of the human” and of its “recognition” (2006: 43). Evidently, in order to establish solidarity with the Other, in order to establish empathy with and political responsibility toward the “human condition” of the Other, this Other has to be recognized as “human.” The “human” is always already a discursive category since it is the product of the linguistic operation of recognition. Yet a category heterogeneous to that of discursivity is what “preconditions the human” – it is the instance of vulnerability, the experience of potential or actual pain.
Even when experienced and categorized as “mental,” “emotional” or “psychological” in its identity-in-the-last-instance pain is a bodily category. When the perplexities of the troubled, humiliated soul that has been subjected to violence are experienced as pain, one inevitably recognizes that an immediate transposition of the psychic experience onto the bodily plane has taken place. When the sufferings of the “soul” become painful we know this through the “body.” Pain can be recognized as pain but through the body. The dichotomy between the two terms is highly problematic, and, therefore, the opposition between “body” and “soul” is *ad hoc*. So I will try to go beyond the falsity of this opposition and argue that it is life-in-its-last-instance, i.e., the category of the *Organic*, which is the bearer-in-the-last-instance of the unadulterated experience of pain and vulnerability.

Leaving aside the question about the body-soul dualism, and the dilemma of which of the two opposed terms represents the *topos* proper of pain, the instance of vulnerability and pain is still defined, by its determination in the last instance, as heterogeneous to the discursive, to language, to signification. Namely, pain – both in its actuality of being wounded and the potentiality of vulnerability – is the instance of the purely experiential, of the experiential *par excellence*. It is an event. It is what happens in spite of any discourse, utterly regardless of the Language. It is the taking-place-of-the–Real. It is the *tuché* that thrusts into the *automaton*. Thus, if vulnerability preconditions the human and provides the basis for its recognition, it needs to be said that, paradoxically, it is the kernel of the *lived* (echoing François Laruelle’s notion of *le vécu*), i.e., of the Real which serves as the foundation of the discursive operation *par excellence*, that of recognition.
Pain is pre-discursive. It is the unadulterated lived (le vécu) put in Francois Laruelle’s terms (1995: 225), or the instance of the ‘evental’ put in Alain Badiou’s terms (2005: 173-177), or the kernel of the Real prior to symbolization (signification) put in Lacanian terms (1998: 53-54). In Spinozian terms, it is life at its most radical: the bodily experiences of pain and/or pleasure are the immediacy of life pulsating with intensity. Nonetheless, the “bodily” is not the material as opposed to the psychic (mental, rational, ideal, etc.) since there is no such opposition in Spinoza’s philosophical universe. Nature is but the expression of the divine essence, and the attributes of cogitatio and extensio are the two chief attributes of the Being which shows itself with at least the two faces: that of Nature and that of God. Matter and idea are not two opposed categories in Spinoza. Highest category of God (or Nature) is the Being, and it is not split between matter and idea. Moreover, “matter” and “idea” are not among the categories in which Spinoza thinks the Being. The analogous pair of categories, that of cogitatio and extensio, is the binary of attributes which neither exclude nor oppose each other, but are rather mutually complementary. Within this framework of thinking, the Body is not a “material” category or one belonging to the attribute of “extension” exclusively.

The Body is “life” in its identity in the last instance, in its radical immanence, entailing expression through both attributes equally (extension and cogitation). The mental, which is always accomplished through the

le vécu), т.е. на Стварното што служи како темел на
par екселанс дискурзивната операција, операцијата
признавање.

Болката е преддискурзивна. Таа е неизвитопереното
проживеано (le vécu), со зборовите на Франсоа
Ларуел (Laruelle 1995: 225), или со зборовите на Алан
Бадију (Badiou 2005: 173-177), пример за настанското,
или за редица на Стварното пред симболизацијата
(сигнификацијата) во лакановска смисла (1998: 53-
54). Во спинозовска смисла, таа е живот во својот
најрадикален облик: телесните искуства на болката
и/или задоволството се непосредноста на животот
кој дамари од бујност. Па сепак, „телесното“ не е
материјалното наспроти психичкото (менталното,
рационалното, идеалното итн.) бидејќи во
философскиот универсум на Спиноза нема такво
нешто. Природа е само пројава на божествената
суштина, а особините cogitatio и extensio се двете
главни особини на Битното кое покажува барем
dва свои лика: ликот на Природата и ликот на
Бога. За Спиноза материјата и идејата се две две
спротивставени категории. Највисоката категорија на
Бога (или на Природата) е Битието, а тоа не е поделено
между материјата и идејата. Понатаму, „материјата“
и „идејата“ не спаѓаат во категориите во кои Спиноза
го обмислува Битието. Аналогниот пар категории, на
парот cogitatio и extensio, е двојството од особини
што ниту се исключуваат ниту си противречат,
tуку попрво не се надополнуваат. Во оваа
рамка на размислување, Телото не е „материјална“
категорија, ниту категорија што јa припаа исключиво
на особината „простирање“.

Телото е „живот“ во својот идентитет во крајната
инстанца, во својата радикална иманентност, и
повлекува пројава преку обете особини подеднакво
(простирање и мисла). Менталното, што секогаш се
остварува преку емотивното, е одраз на темелната и дефиниричка состојба на нечие постоене – онаа што се одвива на ниво на телото (Spinoza E 5, 14). Телото е парекселане местото на болката и ранливоста, т.е. инстанцата на радикалниот идентитет на животот. Телото е топосот на радикалното (пред-дискурзивното и/или метадискурзивното) соznание за можната опасност по опstanокот на некое „Jaс“.

Овој конкретен познавателен процес што се одвива на ниво на Телото во облик на апсолутна состојба на боиност, по дефиниција, автоматски го придрумува целосна мобилизација – која исто така првенствено се одвива преку телото – за останување во живот, за да се овозможи сопственото преживување (и како тело и како душа).

Онаа инстанца на преддискурзивноста која е Болка, т.е. Ранливост, учествува образувачки во по дефиниција дискурзивната појава на признавање (на „човечкото“). Всушност, таа е состојбата на онаа „дискурзивна категорија“ што се нарекува човештво. Тезата за ранливост како состојба на „човечкото“ имплицира образувачка хетерогеност на човечкото во онаа мерка во која е експериментална/настанска инстанца на ранливост која го овозможува дискурзивното образување на човештвото. Во коренот на „човечкото“ лежи органската инстанца на ранливоста и на болката, во коренот на „човечкото“ го наоѓаме телото што страда. Во коренот на Човечкото е она што е отаде (или, попрво, зад) Човештвото – Телото, организмот подложен на болка исправен пред неприкосновениот повик за самоодржување, секогаш веќе нурнат во борба за опстанок.

Надоврзувајќи се на спинозовската „себична теза“ за нагоноет на поединецот да ја избегнува болката, вклучително и болката што ја доживуваат другите, а emotional, is the reflection of the fundamental, defining state of one’s existence – the one taking place on the level of the body (Spinoza E 5, 14). The body is the location par excellence of pain and vulnerability, i.e., the instance of the radical identity of life. The body is the topos of the radical (pre- or/and meta-discursive) knowledge about a possible threat to the survival of an “I.” This particular cognitive process taking place at the level of the Body in the form of an absolute state of alert is, by definition, automatically accompanied by total mobilization – again, taking place primarily through the body – toward staying-in-life, making one’s own survival (as both body and soul) possible.

That instance of pre-discursiveness which is the Pain, i.e., vulnerability, participates in a formative way in the per definitionem discursive phenomenon of recognition (of the “human”). In fact, it is the condition of that “discursive category” called humanity. The thesis about vulnerability as the condition of the “human” implies the formative heterogeneity of humanity inasmuch as it is the experiential/evental instance of vulnerability which makes possible the discursive constitution of humanity. At the root of the “human” lies the organic instance of vulnerability and pain, at the root of the “human” we find the body that suffers. At the root of the Human is that which is beyond (or rather, behind) Humanity – the body, the organism subjected to pain and confronting the irrevocable call for self-preservation, always already immersed in the struggle for survival.
itself present cognitively, I would say that solidarity
and political responsibility toward the suffering of the
others originates from our ability to identify with the
pain of the other body. We are able to identify with the
body helplessly exposed to a possibility of affliction by
pain, with body’s vulnerability. In fact, the less we can
recognize the other as human, the less “human” he or she
is, such as a child or an old helpless woman or man, the
more we are able to revolt against the violence brought
upon him or her. The less we see a Subject in control
of the potentiality of violent threat against its body the
more we are called upon acting toward its protection: the
level of vulnerability is proportional with the absence of
a masterful subject of humanity.

The less discursive competence they have the more we see
them as vulnerable that we are compelled to protect. The
less they are what is discursively constituted as human,
the more we feel called upon acting humanely. The less
they are human the more they meet human solidarity.
I would claim that recognition of the Other’s humanity
inasmuch as a discursive category is not only unnecessary
for establishing solidarity but also redundant and even
an obstacle to it. It is life to life, individualized through
bodies, that establishes solidarity and not the products
of an operation of recognition called “human.”

Колку помала ни се чини нивната дискурзивна
способност, толку поранливи ни изгледаат, па
мораме да ги штитиме. Колку помалку се она
што дискурзивно се конституирило како човечко,
tолку повеќе ни доаѓа да ги оголуваат човечот
ниво на човечка солидарност. Би тврдела дека
признавањето на човештината на Другиот како
dискурзивна категорија не само што не е неопходно
за воспоставување солидарност, туку е и непотребно,
pа дури и пречка. Токму животот соочен со живот,
индувидуализиран преку телото, е она што воспоставува
солидарност, а не производите од некаква операцiя
на признавање чиј исход се нарекува „човек“.  

Превод од англиски јазик: Огнен Чемерски
References:


