I. Hopes’ Consensus

There has always been a considerable consensus on how consensus is made. The very enactment of this sentence explains how consensus works. Agreeing with this first sentence can only be performed because there is some irreducible desire to do so (apart from the enmeshing of performance and performed). And it takes the existence, real or imaginary, of sociality to institute desire as the pillar of hope and futurity. But for consensualists to negate sociality does not embody desire, and only its negation. Perhaps the case is the mere perpetuation of desire in self-loving circles of sameness impervious to desire’s futures. It is in this sense that the dissensus inherent in the “anti-social” turn in queer studies marks the potential of auto-affection, achieved by nothing but a heart non-relative to all the other hearts and reducible only to a mechanistic death-driven, egoistic copulation. Copulation not with the lover at that, but a fetishistic one with the disjointed parts of society. Among these there are hearts as well.

If you could agree with how consensus is achieved, and how it is self-explained, you can now aggregate and inflate it as much as you need to. This has been done by several interlocutors of Edelman (Power 2009, Muñoz 2009, Floyd 2010), and I propose that it is the logic of reproductive desire, and not of anti-reproductive, anti-liberal and anti-representational arguments, that lies at the hearts of Edelman’s polemists. In this text I claim that what constitutes the possibility to veer Edelman’s anti-political project in a life-affirmative political vertex is merely the (political) desire to do so, always already inscribed in politics-as-society. Such desire is neither a social given, nor a residue, but the kernel of anti-social dissensus against all consensus which cannot be brought back to reason and political argumentation, but to the eroticism of the hearts—an eroticism which itself opposes all opposition and in particular the opposition between the body and the social. Here, I concentrate on the first chapter of Lee Edelman’s No Future (Edelman 2004, 1-33). I read this chapter together with some subsequent criticisms and commentaries which try to rectify a barred “political” residue (or potential) which, as much as it is anti-social, is considered to be politically emancipatory as well.

There is a hidden hypocrisy in bringing about hope through consensus’ sloganeering: the hidden and forgotten desire
in agreeing with one’s desire when one takes it to be not desire, but consensus itself. To agree with one’s desire for hope and futurity is not the same as taking desire – towards consensus and shared politics – to be hope and future. It appears that Lee Edelman’s polemic against politics was relocated on a (quasi-)liberalist pitch, even when anti-liberal polemists agree on his equation of politics with reproductive futurism (Power 2009), they try to save or invent a politic of non-reproductive futurism. There is no sense whatsoever in defending any politics if the intent is not to restore the social. The extent to which these two terms are involved in each other’s survivals is so insuperable that no restoration of an alternate sociality which takes its course from Edelman’s discussion of reproductive futurism can end up taking pleasure from the death drive and its excessive circus of meaningless fucking flesh. Left without politics, the social exists as a quasi-tribe; left without the social, politics survives as pure death drive.

Through something we can call “the hidden consensus of hope” (or even “hope’s depression”), critics have relocated the negation of all politics both back in the political and in liberalism - not because they have a different social class or theoretical class background, but because I think they have a quantum of irreducible social desire which swarms in their own “imaginary (political) past,” whose subtending master is the very signifier to which Edelman opposes nothing because queerness means nothing for both left and right (NF, 16). Irreducible, that is, to the sort of ungraspable (against-all-reason) idea that the lack of lack in jouissance does not merely reproduce the logic of lack by bringing affirmation through double negation; that the negation of negation does not merely swerve back to affirmation; that negation is not a pure “NO,” but that this “NO” has a beating heart whose blood stream halts whenever the plasma of politics gets into the drip and whose eroticism is ultimately its anti-politics. That without this plasma’s intrusion, an all anti-social “yes” contaminates life with a certain ethical discourse of truth and life-in-truth: that we, sithomosexuals as we are, are those who have to affirm our own passing away as a structureless passage of rite towards death, for we have passed in as nothings in all political projects whose freaky playthings we are. That, finally, we are political only in the terminal moment of saying that the future has stopped for us, and our desire and its uncanniness saves us merely discursively from the political stupor that we come to figure: that is, the stupor we are being made to embody. And, strikingly enough, that the stupor we are and whose embodiments we come to be should be ethically embraced by us as subject: and this is the only position that makes us emancipated subjects, emancipated, that is, from the sepulcher of the future, and thus anti-political forever after.

Simply put, there is a desire for hope which is equated with (the theorist’s) desire itself – in particular, the desire for hope and utopia, where these blend together in a performative “consensus.” For upon the publication of Edelman’s No Future, in the numerous attending, if quite collaborative, debates surrounding it, what has actually been brought up as obvious is not the very obviousness of hope: it was the social construction of hope through consensus and the consensual construction of hope – and the theoretical desire as its surplus – that manifested what Edelman’s work revealed. Namely, that, for some anti-social agents who choose not to choose the social where they have to live an impossible ethics, there is a way to inhere outside the tomb of the signifier and the
Identities

The cradle of reproductive futurism (sinthomosexuality). Second, almost every corrective reading of Edelman proposed somehow presuppose a disciplinary unity of the newly established brands of queer utopianism, predicated on antisociality/antirelationality and rationality/relationality (Muñoz 2009, Floyd 2010). And third, that these two streams of queer dissent – both thriving on the outskirts of academic proselytism, as if neither reproduce an anti-social sameness in their own self-same logic of reproduction – have to exist unilaterally, has now been accepted. This is all right, but the unity itself already subtends some primitive form of academic sociality which is not quite graspable for those involved in paradoxical movements seeking to extend the logic of non-consensual anti-natalism in their abhorrent socius (e.g., those behind “Against Equality” or the “Gay Shame”). As if there is some premeditated need to unify sociality and antisociality in queer in order not to disrupt the unique indivisibility of queer that emanates in its all-transcending non-unity; as if in order to provide a shared Real-political position from which both camps to drag their corresponding consensus (where dissensus is a paradoxical form of consensus), thus imagining a common well of un-reasoning whose water break from queer theorists’ wombs, wombs impossible for impregnation at that.

What can be called “anti-natalism” in Edelman is “where the future stops,” the “desire to die” now where “now” does not pass as the “future.” The lesson to be learned from Edelman is not a Foucaultian notion of writing the ontology of the present; it is to live the now as an unsignified future coming in the figure of the NO, and not NOW. Just as being anti-natalist does not morally involve the committal of suicide, just as non-procreation does not necessarily mean human extinction, so the desire to die, or the stopping of future, does not mean to stop living: it only means to start dying without signifying death as life – to stop the world (see NF, note 42, 180). It only means that, as Thomas Ligotti would say, it takes a “yes” in our hearts to say “no,” and to live a life ethically complicit with this. Sara Ahmed comes closer to this when she says that “[t]o embrace the negative or to say yes to a no cannot be described as a purely negative gesture” (Ahmed 2010, 162), but she already has in mind a certain dialectical optimism. I turn now to several arguments about the possibility to make politics out of a form of non-reproductive futurism which negates Edelman’s negation of futurity altogether, albeit with the pretension to integrate his notion of politics=the social=reproductive futurism. What this means is, as vexing as this may sound, that all anti-liberal and allegedly sympathetic critics of Edelman should temporarily line-up behind a crypto-capitalist notion of social theory which allows them to invest in anti-capitalist theories of non-reproductive futurism. This is not a defendable position and the critics in question can only negate their own socially imposed anti-sociality and alienation from the dominant order so that the order becomes pervious to such undefendability, to result in a non-reproductive politics. No one can simply believe that any scientific, state-funded establishment will intentionally support such futuristic social theory that negates non-reproduction. I take it, then, that the critics concerned here do not expect their investment in futurity to be graspable by today’s scientific redistributors of shortages in the dominant social order and that it is this depressing condition that supports their brandishing of hope and utopianism in social theory.

If the central question, after Edelman, is: “can the sinthomosexuals live without politics at all without risking
to stop fucking with the jouissance?,” then we also have to inadvertently ask: is there any form of politics that could arise from the negation of all politics? What term of opprobrium do critics omit in order to advocate some form of compromise between their shared negation of reproductive futurism and socio-political utopianism and politics in general?

In his review of No Future, Mark Fisher observes that “[o]ne of the great virtues of Edelman’s thesis is that it restores the distinction between queerness and homosexuality per se.” (Fisher 2005) This is so in as much as Edelman tells us intuitively that he will not work with a notion of queerness that is going to “affirm a structure” (NF, 3), as all politics are conservative since they affirm structures. But he does not tell us if he is going to propose a politic at all, and if he does not do that, what, if anything, comes after politics. This is why:

[i]t is often not clear whether Edelman is opposed to politics as such or is agitating for a wider definition of the political. It seems to me that, rather than equivocating politics with “the social” (as Edelman seems to) the true site of political struggle lies in what the dominant order calls the extra-political. When there is only one (permissible) side, it is imperative to locate the Outside. (ibid.)

As much as Edelman locates the Outside as sinthomosexuality, he does not want to bring what is not reducible for him to politics, i.e., the “extra-political” – quite comprehensible for both left and right interests – to any form of politics. This means that Edelman refuses to reorder the social order should it be forced to, or is willing to, politicize the “excluded” extra-political and turn it into an “included” political livability (whence his criticism of Butler). The very idea of reordering the order is political, relational, and social, and thus it does not serve the end of Edelman: not to reduce queers to a sorry state where they have to politically legitimize and institute the death drive and the sinthomosexual figure. And if this idea stops here, so does the future. As Ahmed says, “[t]o affirm an order might be to define and regulate what is thinkable in advance of thought.” (Ahmed 2010, 161) This is the always-already-prepoliticization of any social order through the imaginary inebriation of the future, done by the image of the Child; there is no other thought of and for the future than that of the Child-missile. What remains is the principle of “being for being against,” (ibid, 162) which does not evolve to rational queer commonality, which is not read as a politics, but recedes into the isolated world of stand-alone individuals whose puppet master is the death drive. The remainder of queerness, “embodying the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order,” (NF, 25) is some sort of mechanistic quasi-society/temporally designed mass of queer puppetry in incessant hyper-teleological gang-bang. It is a community whose telos is political self-destruction. As Edelman riffs on Lacan, “political self-destruction in-heres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life.” (NF, 30) The refusal of all politics, to repeat the earlier claim here, is to live death and the death drive literally/figuratively and not to live the life as the Heideggerian Sein zum Tode, for “queerness could never constitute an authentic or substantive identity, but only a structural position determined by the imperative of figuration.” (NF, 24) Sein zum Tode, read as a phenomenological political imperative of sorts, is still reducible to a liberalist pro-life queer positionality: it does acknowledge the formerly suppressed self-consciousness for death, but it seeks to
abolish it at the expense of birthing more death. Even as queers/sinthomosexuals occupy the place of the death drive (its “khôra”), “[t]he structural position of queerness, after all, and the need to fill it remain.” (NF, 27) Only that the fill-up of death is not communal.

We do not have to read political self-destruction as the end of children’s life; rather, it is the end of the figure of the Child that frames the future for those who do not want a future with children and who embrace the disfiguration of identity. It is in this sense that “queerness … is understood as bringing children and childhood to an end.” (NF, 16) Hence, what is at stake here is that sinthomosexuals’ inherent “meaninglessness is not a kind of jouissance, it is merely the acknowledgement that children are always-dying so that others may live.” (Power 2009, 14) Repeating the Child is not merely the politics of meaninglessness, it is something much more anxious: the politics of re-signifying the crashing course of an impending meaninglessness on to the future as such. Anti-futurism seeks a way out of the imposed ethical responsibility to repeat the very figural status of children’s finality (and the ethics of guilt behind this that breeds reproductive futurism from behind). So the alleged temporality of queer anti-futurism, which still appears to feature some retained future, comes from the very act of childhood’s repetition, and with this, politics as such. Once the figure of the Child is exchanged for the obliteration of jouissance’s lack, anti-futurism culminates in the arrest of history. As Floyd says, “[f]or Edelman, childhood figures the homogeneous, narcissistic time of mere repetition.” (Floyd 2010, 15) Doing away with this “time” amounts to a highly egoistic queer negativity, whose only point of temporally achievable commonality is the art of fucking with and for the jouissance: the ability to be the senseless acrobat of the death drive, the craftsmanship of fucking with the heterosexual matrix not in its name.

In seeking a way out of anti-futurism and such queer pessimism, Ahmed has this presumption in mind:

Queer pessimism matters as a pessimism about a certain kind of optimism, as a refusal to be optimistic about “the right things” in the right kind of way. …Queer pessimism becomes interesting as an alien effect although to become pessimistic as a matter of principle is to risk being optimistic about pessimism itself. (Ahmed 2010, 162)

Yet, queer pessimism is an “alien effect” only in a social order which does not aim at its own political self-destruction. It is the “natural” (quasi-consensual) effect of queer anti-politics. It is the position that having children and future is “not all right” (which is “against all reason”) and that this cannot take any right direction. Thus, the difference which I think Edelman makes here, the step towards a non-dialectical anti-futurist queer pessimism which fears not its political dissolution, but desires it (even if this desire is introduced to only suspend the very dialectic of desire), is that even if the dialectic is temporarily kept, it is kept to only seize the temporality as the pestilent fungus onto the “future:” its construal under queer negativity stops the production of the third term, that is, both the child and the civil society (be it the left proletariat or the right vigilantism). In this sense Edelman’s anti-futurism is a queer response of Marx’s civil society against itself, but without any envisioned political agenda ahead, for the heads of queer anti-futurists is full only with the mindlessness of jouissance. Meaningless it may be not, but if it is something in actuality, it is mindlessness, and this is why it is “against all reason.” The only
remaining intellect would be some mechanical recollection of how to fuck with other sinthomosexuals which figure the non-assimilable extra-political. Edelman’s insistence on sinthomosexuality (which explicitly does not reduce itself to queers) in his plea against relationality is precisely because – and Muñoz is absolutely right in saying this – “the antirelational turn in queer studies was a partial response to critical approaches to a mode of queer studies that argued for the relational and contingent value of sexuality as a category.” (Muñoz 2009, 11) Sinthomosexuality is this anti-political quasi-category of self-destruction which does not aim to preserve neither paradoxality nor utopianism.

This is why I find little sense in advocating “queer rationalism” such as Power’s. (Power 2009) For all the justice behind her argument that there is a “kind of rationalism that escapes Edelman’s equation of ‘reason’ with futurity,” (ibid., 2) and even though I absolutely agree with her insistence that it is irrationality, and not rationality that governs politics, and even though the desired antipolitics can turn out to actually embody rationality, there is still the fact that although the politics of representation is a violent form of modernity’s self-perpetuation, this very representation is social and it is society which has instituted irrationality as its forgotten, politically affirmed structure. It is society in itself which “chooses not to choose” in politics, and hence it is society’s irrationality that is socially regulated by itself against itself in what we still think of as politics. If this is the case, it is hard to see the step towards queer rationalism as enabling any future, for representation’s insanity, with all its babies in between, can give birth only to the shortage of representation, including queer rationalism. True, if queer rationalism is anti-representational and falls under the rubric of direct democracy, then we have to wait for the time when the latter will not be tied to representation and see what happens with birth control instead. For then it may well turn that our enslavement by children will disappear and we will have the right to call “politics” any form of misrepresentation and miscarriage of the future: just about the perfect rationality of our anarchist desires. But that will not happen unless we deny all politics and demand non-representational politics which is not a disguised desire for representation. To do this, you have to negate society itself. Since for Power “what is even less thinkable than queer negativity is the social itself,” (ibid., 14) this is a completely different project, for the unthinkability of the social already involves the projection of politics (and the desire to do so), while the anti-rational unintelligibility of queer negativity does not (but involves the pleasure of not doing so). Does queer negativity not demand the existence of society? Yes, but only if its own teleology is temporarily political in that it aims at its political self-dissolution into mindless jouissance in order to embody what it is (instead of acceding to being what it is) – a death drive with children smiles that will never be born.

José Muñoz in his Cruising Utopia appears to ascribe a rhetorical figure – the “romance” – to Edelman where what the latter sees is the mere mechanicism of enjoyment. For example, he says that “[a]lthough the antirelational approach assisted in dismantling an uncritical understanding of queer community, it nonetheless quickly replaced the romance of community with the romance of singularity and negativity.” (Muñoz 2009, 10) It would be striking to believe that Edelman actually means to flirt with negativity, when all he talks about lies in the sexual domain, disattached from the politicization of queers’
emotional feel-good tripping, or at least it so seems to me. Muñoz goes further in his romance-ridden utopianism claiming that “antirelational approaches to queer theory are romances of the negative, wishful thinking, and investments in deferring various dreams of difference.” (ibid, 11) However, it is the fear of sameness, the ominous sameness of male homosexuality, the parting with this fear that lies at the heart of anti-futurism and anti-natalism, and not the saving of differences. In short, to repeat Edelman, the Child enshrines the value of sameness because of which queers are condemned: “an insistence on sameness that intends to restore an Imaginary past.” (NF, 21) The Child steals the very model of sameness which queerness comes to embody. The political trouble of queerness is sameness, and as such, queerness/sinthomosexuality will never have the power – nor do they have to have the desire to – reclaim it in order to have politically liveable lives (Butler), for to be against the Child is “against all reason.” Queers can be as different as they are, but they will never win battle for sameness. It is here that it becomes clear why Edelman refuses politics and identifies it entirely with the social.

Kevin Floyd claims that both Edelman’s and Muñoz’s books “want to refuse a future toward which contemporary regimes of hetero- and homonormativity seem to want to push us, for example.” (Floyd 2010, 4) This is right: this is the shared metapolitical level of both authors. He further rightly claims that our identification with the Child is “a representation of the future which, covertly, amounts only to an identification of the future with the present.” (ibid., 6) Again, here we can see the withdrawal from politics: not only that the Child is already a representation of the future (and renders queers less and less representable in as much as they do not reproduce biologically), but the very future reflect the image of the present. Floyd goes after Edelman, but he inserts the term “utopian” inside his argument:

Because utopian thinking is always also ideological thinking, thinking conditioned by and expressive of the present, the utopian break with the present can only be thought as stasis, as a break from the movement of time itself, a state without change; this is another way of saying that this utopian break can only be thought as death. (ibid., 8)

In a Benjaminian move, Floyd’s rendition of utopia, which does not allow us to imagine “positive utopian future,” at least gives us a spoiled optimism which makes it possible to imagine “the destruction of the present” and with this, to untie ourselves from the future even though it is still there as it will come to us: baby-faced. For Floyd, “utopia” is not different, but identical to death, and Edelman’s avoidance of investment in (non-reproductive) futurism is wrong. But what that means really? That we have to enjoy an already mortified, child-ridden utopia, if only to save the present and keep out of insanity’s reach? If this is so, this is a realistic and bearable project, somewhere between “queer optimism of difference” and “queer pessimism of identity,” a logistical thought management which does not allow us to revel in pathology and death drive, but a horizon sustaining the meaning of now for the dissolution of our future landscape full of children.

II. Hearts’ Dissenus

What I have tried to explain in the beginning was that there is an irreducible form of desire subtending utopianism, even if it has the self-consciousness for its own
production of illusions for the present, and that such desire is tied to the logic of consensus which is always political (especially when what is at stake is non/reproduction). Hope is made by consensus. Mindless anti-futurism is achieved by dissensus. It seems to me that if dissensus is not the false mirror of consensus, if it is an altogether other, wholly other, mirror located in the non-impregnatability of queerness, its location is extra-political and it lies in the “heart.” There is, regardless of the rhetorically superb machinations of Edelman which rend the text a small machine for the non-production of children and meaning, something affective in *No Future*, tamed by the shrewd of syntax. There must exist the possibility for this: that there is ultimately something in Edelman’s heart, that is, a spiritual eroticism of the life pump, which is “against all reason.” It is not all rationality versus irrationality that is at stake here. In short, there is the possibility that unreason lies in the non-politicizable heart. And if this is a “political possibility,” so be it and let all politics with its family in the queer negationist’s heart so that it delights in its final session of aborting the future.

There have been the times when the bellies of great many of us, formerly zealous, and now merely mechanical, proponents of equality, were in fire. These were the times of politics. I take Edelman’s anti-futurism as itself the figure of the anti-politics of time and the undoing of the relation between time and politics to the point of insanity (what else is anti-relationality if not a form of insanity?). And as these political times came to an end with pernicious homonormativity and reformed gay-friendly capitalism – that is, with a false restoration of the political, now governed by self-destructive economics which is anti-women and anti-child, as Power says, (Power 2009, 5) there remains an irreducible insanity, other than capitalism’s, an insanity where anti-identity and sameness are perilously close. It is the unreason and insanity of those who pry open their being and arrested future through their being for being against or through their fuck-spree with the political. I propose to read this unreason with what Bataille has called “the eroticism of the hearts” in order to explain the rejection of politics in Edelman.⁸

In Bataille’s tripartite eroticism, “the eroticism of the hearts” is the second term between eroticism of the bodies and spiritual eroticism. While it may appear more logical that anti-futurism is more identifiable with the first kind (because it is the mere shattering of the experience of yourself, the annihilating and irreversible sacrifice, an act that does not save the place of eroticism, namely, the sacred), eroticism of the bodies still allows the organization and hence politicization of one’s vertigo of identity. In this state, the individual is manipulatable to all forces external and closest to immediate sexual drives. But the second eroticism, that of the hearts, allows a totality with the lover which makes possible the loss of identity.

This loss is somewhat similar to Edelman’s rejection to marry “identity and futurity in order to realize the social subject.” (NF, 13-14) In the eroticism of the hearts, lovers are in that intermediate position between their leaving the social where the erotic encounter occurred and the final spiritual eroticism which affirms life and hence brings the lovers back to their social bodies. Just as queers “no longer disown but assume their figural identity as embodiments of the figuralization, and hence the disfiguration, of identity itself,” (NF, 24) the lovers in their eroticism of the hearts disown both their spiritual drive to revert back to the social or the initial bodily state
of singularity. As Michael Richardson explains it, the totality in this second stage:

prolongs the eroticism of bodies to the point that a momentary recovery of continuum is experience, deepened by the fusion of bodies: the couple become a joint egoism, but this imposes a new discontinuum and it offers only an image of the miracle of a desirable continuity of being. (Richardson 1994, 109)

Thus, there is an irrecuperable differentiation of the beings at this point which can reach only to a state of imaginary continuation of life. If the sex act “must be equated with sacrifice,” (ibid.) then the sacrifice of Edelman’s unreason – the sacrifice of politics in itself - lies in the eroticism of his heart giving up the balance of life and death achieved in the sacrificial logic of lovers’ reproduction. If for Edelman “the future stops here,” in sinthomosexuals’ fuck-fest of non-reproduction and the barring of meaning in time, then in Bataille’s eroticism of the hearts what appears to be a recovery through collective egoism is precisely the point where one can consciously choose not to choose the third moment, the spiritual eroticism which affirms eroticism as “the full approbation of life.” (ibid) It is this third moment of eroticism in Bataille that appears to recuperate the projection of desire and its reproductive force of self-perpetuation. Queer negativity and anti-futurism are, when read through the eroticism of the hearts as a figuration of copulation and its undisturbed egoism, an auto-affecting suspension of the social between the bodily and the social.

Thus, Edelman’s anti-futurism, his anti-politics-against-all-reason, in short, his unreason, stops “here,” or there, where all the here stops: at the heart which is the sacrificial place of eroticism, copulation and egoism against all names, a stoppage in the doom of a mechanistic death-driven gang-bang with the mortified social that we enliven just as mechanistically with children.

Blind for all politics that might be, or better yet, for all politics impossible, what the hearts of the sinthomosexual lovers refuse to do is to agree on ever stopping to copulate: even with the heterosexual matrix. Being two, three, countless little fucking mindless machines, they disagree to stop fucking in the future. And the future stops here.

Notes:

1. Under the moral aegis that a politics which does not affirm life is not politics, an aegis which Edelman embraces which itself forbear us in a new ethics of anti-natalism.

2. I am not aware of a notion of consensus that is not social or socially-determined. To read dissensus as the perfectly perversely inverted emanation of consensus – if dissensus is taken as the agreement of all that disagree on a given social – is ethically wrong, because this both denies and demands individual autonomy: an old liberal trickstery.

3. I am fully aware that my brief reading of Edelman through Bataille at the end of this text involves an argument about the antipolitization of dissensus, an argument author such as Edelman might not want to extend, since he does remain vague whether there is a sort of anti-social politics which is not only anti-representational, anti-natalist and anti-futurist, but somehow “affirms a structure” incorruptible by the dominant hetero-order. We still have to wait for his sequel Bad Education to figure that out. This does not mean that one should not follow the structure of his reasoning as a figural (and thus ironic) structure against all reason, however individualist and fascist it is. In this sense, here I take the liberty to say that Edelman’s embracing of right-wing anti-queer arguments – which not merely do not make queer any more queer, but more or less demand its refusal – is in dangerous proximity with American
homosexual right-wing writer Jack Donovan (published under the name Malebranche 2007), whose (anti-gay/queer) notion of androphilia, albeit politically charged with alpha-male homomilitarism, has at its core the virulent and vertiginous self-destruction of the Acéphale group.

4. All subsequent quotations from this book are given parenthetically in the text.

5. In a note that strikes me as the queer rendition of Foucault’s paralyzing self-interrogation in The Archeology of Knowledge’s conclusion, Edelman is done with the question of his own persona and the not-yet-born and predictable – and because of this always already born – criticisms against him. See note 19, 157.

6. Safe for Lacan, Edelman does not do justice to his own anti-reproductive project in that he does not seek to intellectually back himself with other relevant theories such as Schopenhauer or Weininger, or recent ones as Benatar and Ligotti. True, his is not the metaphysics of disappearance, it is more like the denial of politically figured dis/appearance.

7. To the argument that the times are not over because either there is one shared time or because this end is merely a rhetorical fantasy, we should respond that the repetition of times’ end does not make the and any less real to those who want to see it just as the desire for queer rationality, hope and utopia cannot be reined in by any queer antirelationality.

8. We have to remember the war context of Acéphale and the College of Sociology, of course. Acéphale remained just that: deprived of its raison d’être, since “the true conjuration sacrée required a human sacrifice. To bring about a new age of the crowd, of survivors held ‘in the grip of a corpse,’ someone needed to become the Acéphale. Someone needed to lose his head. It never happened” (Donovan 2010). For writers like Donovan, however symbolically, as in the case of Edelman, however ironically, “modern man has truly lost his head” (idem). For modern man, read masculine androphiles. I myself do not intend to compare real human life with the Symbolic (order), but to me Acéphale’s final impotence is at least partially embodied in Edelman’s rejection of politics.

9. Spiritual eroticism would be merely the prelude towards reproduction and child rearing.

References:


