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Parties of Order Right and Left

Keywords: climate, capitalism, growth, nationalism, fascism, refugee, political violence, policy

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Abstract: "Parties of Order Right and Left" takes the right-authoritarian turn (particularly in Central Europe) as an opportunity to reflect on the left-authoritarian turn elsewhere in Europe and "the West" more broadly. The talk pays special attention to the shared faith in policy imposition as the necessary and sufficient mechanism to address social volatility, notably the volatility both expressed and borne by surplus populations and climate refugees. The presupposition of policy solutions even in times of social catastrophe is traced through two parallel texts, Andreas Malm's *How to Blow Up a Pipeline* and Kim Stanley Robinson's *Ministry for the Future*, and their shared theory of political violence as policy weapon. It concludes with a discussion regarding the nationalist implications of policy solutions more broadly and the historically specific demand for internationalism against border regimes in present conditions.

This talk begins by naming two limits. The first is what Marx calls "the limit to capital," which he insists is "capital itself." For those of you for whom that might seem like an opaque formulation, the significance is this: even as capital is compelled to accumulate just to remain stable, its intrinsic compulsions — the requisite mechanisms through which this accumulation is achieved — in the same movement undermine capital's own basis for producing surplus value and thus delivering accumulation. Elsewhere, Marx calls this the "moving contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce labor time to a minimum, while it posits labor time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth."[1] This is always happening. It is immanent to capital, and in the manner of a dialectical process, even when we see growth we are seeing the destruction of the possibility of growth, in a process I have elsewhere referred to as "the production of non-production," a process now reaching its end. The end arrives in fits and starts, and is unevenly distributed, but it has broad and profound effects. Chief among these, arguably, is a declining ability to internalize more labor inputs, such that the absolute and relative portion of humans who live outside the life-granting discipline of the wage or its derivatives is growing, in a movement unlikely to reverse. There are other consequences worth naming, such as the decreasing ability for states — which after all draw their budgets from capital's returns — to

[1] Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*. Trans. Martin Nicolaus (Penguin Books, 1973). Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch14.htm

purchase social stability. These are massive particulars. In general, this is something like a total social fact. So, that is the first limit: the end of growth.

The second limit is climate collapse. I trust that this does not require much elucidation, being in many ways more empirical. It would be convenient to say that just as the end of growth is internal to the logic of capital, climate collapse is external, but this is not the case. In some regard we know this historically: the ever-improving capacity for dating anthropogenic climate change now synchronizes it, per the Sixth Assessment report of the IPCC 6, almost perfectly with the appearance of the steam engine and the accompanying demand for carbon burn. But, we can think of ecological annihilation as systematically conjoined with the end of growth. Here is just one case, albeit a crucial case: Capital's decreasing ability to exploit the global labor pool, and its *relative* loss of *absolute* surplus value, leads to loss of profitability for capital as a whole. Preservation of profitability thus demands countervailing measures; crucial among these is lowering the cost of physical inputs, which at least temporarily prevents the rising organic composition of capital even as technical composition climbs inexorably. And so we see massive investments in infrastructure designed to increase the speed and magnitude of resource extraction even as floods cover Pakistan. The same floods will cover Mumbai and Miami, Istanbul and Djakarta, Lagos and London. So that is the second limit.

It may be that all of this is a preface, in that all substantial political discussion in the present takes place within these two limits and in the shadow of their interaction. This interaction often seems to set social fractions against each other. The clearest example of this is the familiar insistence that resource extraction means jobs, as in the case of, say, workers employed on the Dakota Access Pipeline or Nord Stream 2, and thus that climate protection interferes not just with capitalist dynamism but with the needs of labor: a powerful impasse of the present. At other moments the consequences of the two limits run in the same direction, a point to which we will shortly return. Regardless, thinking politics in the present inevitably involves coordinating the two limits, understanding their unity, understanding the balance of particular forces that they set loose in any given circumstance. Were I to move from here to discussing the United States presidency, or the new constitution in Chile, or the deadly wave of violence against transgender people, that discussion would be within those two limits. But I want to talk instead about Denmark. Sort of. I do not think I can speak about Denmark until I first address the authoritarian turn in Southeast Europe that is the grim occasion for our gathering together, so let me start there.

The Eurozone has been, for quite some time, a zero-sum economy. Zero-sum is simply a way of saying "end of growth" from the perspective of competition among national economies. Per the economists Will Bartlett and Ivana Prica,

> The Core countries have suffered from secular stagnation as their economies have matured and the autonomous part of their growth has diminished. Their economic growth has been propelled by exports to the rest of the EU leading to structural imbalances within the Eurozone with a trade

> surplus in Germany and the Core countries, as the countries in the Periphery and super-Periphery are consumers of Core country exports.[2]

This is a particularly helpful gloss in that it not only names the zero-sum situation but frames it as a story of core and periphery, reminding us of that curious double circumstance wherein the Eurozone is the capitalist core from the perspective of the globe, while at the same time possessing its own core and periphery. Wealth flows inward without producing new wealth that might flow back outward; the crisis of Greece post-2008 (so dramatic that it drove a nominally socialist government to overturn the absolute will of its people in what can only be called a Policy Civil War) is here exemplary rather than unique.

Of what is Greece exemplary? Several things, but among them, it is worth extracting three features. One, they have persistently provided the figure, or possibility, or threat, of departure from the EU and the Eurozone. While the UK, lacking the conundrum of shared currency, was more able to navigate a departure (even as they demonstrated the almost intractable choreographic difficulties), Grexit is in some sense the original name for the spectre of the breakup, in a scenario that explicitly dramatized the imbalanced flow of wealth across the Eurozone from periphery to core. Two, Greece saw early on during the post-2008 era the rise to some parliamentary power of a fascist party tied to a violent street movement. Three, the portion of the Euro periphery that is particularly exposed to the global periphery — to extraction zones and sacrifice zones; to the immiseration and warring left behind by colonial demolition; to regions particularly vulnerable to high heat and high waters; to the nations that within the international order serve both as the proletarian states and the lumpen states where the superexploited and the entirely excluded are left to await the deadly temperature of wet-bulb 35° Celsius — is of course Southern Europe, for which Greece is a signal outpost, albeit sharing certain border dynamics with Italy, Spain, Cyprus, and Malta. And it is particularly Southeast Europe that provides a corridor filled with complex interchanges through which refugees make their way toward the core of the core.

To state the obvious, these three features I have identified with Greece are one, under the heading of *nation*. Like the Idea of West, like the Idea of Democracy, these features have moved outward from Greece to the wider landscape. Not that the idea of "nation" is new; rather it is the particular configuration of the nation within our two limits. The bid for economic "renationalization" now stalks the Eurozone in its entirety, called for by parliamentary parties and social mobilizations across the region. Authoritarian nationalisms, more and less violent, light up the map of Europe; Golden Dawn would prove a spectacle for which the hard nationalism of Fidesz was one durable actuality. And this nationalism is *realized — made real*, in the most literal sense — at the border: in border regimes, in the treatment of refugees, in the treatment of everyone deemed not adequately *of the nation*, those persons for whom the refugee is the paradigm, and the border the place of placement.

In some sense *placement* is everything. That's what makes order. It is constitutive of the party of order that they put

[2] Will Bartlett and Ivana Prica, "Interdependence between Core and Peripheries of the European Economy: Secular Stagnation and Growth in the Western Balkans," *LEQS Paper* 104 (2016), 7.

things in their place. By "things" I mean people. If capital makes things of people — as Marx suggests in the section on the fetish character of the commodity — then the party of order carries out the work of putting these particular *kinds of things* in their place with brutal zeal. In an ultra-formalist sense, one could almost say that the specific place doesn't matter as long as everyone is put in one. Hierarchy and subordination are the ends, and more pressingly, the preservation and the extension of *the capacity to subordinate*. There is putting in place, there is *the power to put in place*...and that is the ordinal goal for the party of order.

But I said "almost," for this abstraction is incomplete. The particulars of placement matter to the extent that they mean to replicate the order distilled form an image of the past whose main character is that it is idealized; the idealization always projects a nation that is healthy — meaning, in command of necessary resources and bursting with youthful energy. That is to say, the nation before the two limits began to appear for it.

Some clarifications are now in order. I do not wish to be seen here as in some implicit way justifying or forgiving the authoritarian regimes and tendencies all around us by suggesting that they are a response to *the problem of the refugee,* and have simply chosen the wrong answer. Both party and refugee are consequences of this changed situation that I have rendered under the shorthand of the *two limits*, the double catastrophe that conjures both new parties of order and growing flows of refugees, a lord and bondsman for the present, laced with fatality.

But we must also clarify the significance of *nation*. The present pressure on the category expresses an extraordinary reversal, a series or reversals, a series of *reversals of reversals*. The increasing unification of global processes under the law of value, even as value production wanes, and the shared planetarily awareness of "climate," even as it collapses: these put a heretofore unseen pressure on the status of *the nation*.

Nonetheless, I do not mean to exaggerate the role of the state, sovereignty, and so on in the historical drama that I am trying to outline. There is, after all, in this narrative, no nation absent a national economy. In the first instance, the system of subordination and hierarchy, which is one end for the party of order, for authoritarian nationalism, is operative in part because it produces a differential citizenship (and non-citizenship) across which value can flow, abjecting some more than others so as to allow downward wage arbitrage for all. And, in the last instance, the *placement* previously mentioned achieves coherence only within the framework of a political economy. One is *in a place* to a great degree because one is employed, or is within the wage matrix; it is exactly those who are excluded from the wage matrix, those socially surplus, who are thereby placeless, or freed from the bonds of place into the misery of mobility. It is that population surplus to the needs of capital that swells the ranks of refugees, all of which is to say, climate refugees are also political-economic refugees, and the two limits are one.

The climate refugee is one figure over which Andreas Malm and Kim Stanley Robinson meet, in multiple essays and books. In some degree, perversely, they share this with the party of order: the refugee is their orienting subject, or at least one of them. I might even suggest that the

voyagers in Robinson's *Mars* trilogy (the early work that made him a renowned author; I always want to say "the *Marx* Trilogy") are on the one side colonizers, making an actual colony on Mars, but on the other side are refugees, fleeing an Earth whose increasing inhospitability, political and ecological, would become Robinson's great theme.

I want to dwell on Robinson's most recent novel, *Ministry for the Future,* for a few minutes, eventually in relation to Malm's recent *How to Blow Up a Pipeline.* Without contraries there is no progression, and I will try to set forth my contraries before the end. But, before that, I want to insist on the importance of both of these books. Both take on one of the tasks for which books are well-suited but rarely achieve: *entering into thinkability* concepts or visions or politics that have been rendered socially unthinkable, set outside the frame that is ideology.

Malm's book, if you have not read it, is sorely lacking in actual instructions for how to dispatch with pipelines. It means, rather, to take on the taboo against political violence, to mull it over, to reopen the possibility of debate, and at the same time to historicize the question. That is where I am most sympathetic. Any of us are free to offer up our ethical, normative stances regarding political violence, often presented as strategic claims about its effectiveness: a longstanding rhetorical device that we as a civilization have, after millennia, given its proper name, "concern-trolling." Against this, Malm begins from the inarguable position that, on the one hand, we must register the force with which political violence already constitutes the domination of capital; and on the other, that open counter-violence is at this point guaranteed, so we better have a serious discussion about its practicalities beyond good and evil. This point seems simple, but turns out to be hard to say, and this alone is enough reason to be grateful for the book.

Robinson's recent and epochal *Ministry for the Future* is more difficult to distill into a single function; it is as sprawling and manifold as Malm's is compact and polemical. It is an extraordinary book and I hope everyone will consider reading it. It is not quite what Adorno described as "late style" but has something of that character: a work that, per Edward Said's concise phrasing, declines "the serenity of "ripeness is all" in order to "reopen the questions of meaning, success, and progress."[3] Robinson has intimated that it is his last conventional science fiction novel, and it is in some regard a return to the Mars trilogy, a kind of coming home wherein the object of terraforming, worldmaking in its most literal sense, becomes the Earth itself. The *Mars* trilogy's Frank Chalmers returns here as his inverse, Frank May, as if to signal the completion of a circuit with its repetition and total change. More wittily, we encounter the late-arriving and unobtrusive character of Arthur Nolan, fascinated by transport and by the vastness of nature, at a remove from social doings, a sixty-something Jules Verne fan who circles the planet on an airship. He is that SF commonplace of the starship captain, here brought back to Earth, peering down with a near-panoptic view. From his perch he tracks the great movements of animals, the nascent plenitude to be spotted in the historical worldmaking below him, something like a view of the whole — coming down occasionally to visit with various characters.

[3] Edward W. Said, "On Late Style," *The New York Times* (July 16, 2006). https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/16/books/chapters/0716-1st-said.html

Not a starship captain, then, but the author himself. He is known for short as Art.

Like Art, like late style, the book is at its most extraordinary when it is trying to think the whole, think the interlocking totality that must be confronted in order to address climate change in any significant way. The book's scope and length and multipolar composition — it has over 100 chapters, over a dozen focalizing characters — produce, among other things, a formal argument about the need for this. On multiple occasion and at risk of giving in to the cold charisma of enumeration, the book offers provisional and partial summaries; somewhere around Chapter 89, when the tide has turned, it concedes, "At the meso- and micro-levels, the good projects that were being undertaken were so numerous that they couldn't be assembled into a single list, although they tried." And it tries immediately: "Regenerative ag, landscape restorations, wildlife stewardship, Mondragón-style co-ops, garden cities, universal basic income and services, job guarantees, refugee release and repatriation, climate justice and equity actions, first people support, all these tended to be regional and localized, but they were happening everywhere."[4] There are other such passages throughout the book, gathering as it goes. They are figured, finally — allegorized, arguably — near the very end, when three billion people share in a moment of neo-religious solidarity with the planet, with each other, and with the possibility of collective flourishing.

For us, stuck here in the straits of the present between the two limits, this need to think the whole, to think about all the things that would need to change for anything to change, is itself a taboo subject, as we can witness quite easily in the visions even of the ecomodernists (much less your standard issue liberal, whose worldview the ecomodernist represents in hypertrophied form) for whom a future in which environmental catastrophe has been mitigated looks… a lot like the present, but with more solar, and some fields of windmills through which bullet trains wind. One or two fixes and shazam.

Lukács, in his chapter "Class Consciousness" and later in "The Standpoint of the Proletariat," makes heavy weather of the idea that it is the workers of the world, because of their position as the producers both of use values and surplus value — because of their entrainment within the capitalist totality that is social production — who are uniquely positioned to grasp the whole, to grasp totality, and thus to achieve the consciousness necessary to become a class for themselves, a revolutionary class. Robinson, without using the same language, registers that, as the planetary proletariat outstrips the needs of production and is increasingly surplus to its processes, production can no longer be relied on to provide this view onto the whole. But as the orienting force of what Lukacs calls "second nature" wanes — "structures made by man for man," as he phrased matters — *first nature* asserts itself. This captures the truly epochal transformation implied by the two limits and their dynamic interaction. For Robinson and others (Dipesh Chakrabarty is one example), the experience of climate collapse — to which all are unevenly subject even if not equally responsible, and through which "the environment" is disclosed as a systematic unity, indiscrete, human-made — provides the new conditions for the *thought*

[4] Kim Stanley Robinson, *The Ministry for the Future* (Orbit Books, 2020).

of the whole and the possibility therein of a new and revolutionary class consciousness, particularly among the class of those we might call the climate-vulnerable.

And it is this that brings us to political violence, which is in truth the theme that unites Malm and Robinson's recent works. Their handling of this theme is not identical across *Pipeline* and *Ministry*, and it could not be, given the differences of kind between the two books. They seem to differ on at least one pivotal point. Malm debunks, in coruscating fashion, the book *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, by Ellen Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. Robinson, on the other, seems at one moment to adopt explicitly the claims of the Kennedy School Professor and the former State Department officer from the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations in Kabul. "Over the years we saw what worked and refined our methods," Robinson writes. "Violence didn't work, numbers did. That's the secret, in case you are looking for the secret to resisting an imperial power…Non-violent resistance of the total population, or as much of it as you can get. That's what works."[5]

But of course, being a novel, this cannot be reduced to the author producing a truth-claim. The words are given to a nameless narrator reflecting back from the future on the struggle of Hong Kongers to avoid Chinese rule. We should not take it as the book's summary position, even if it arrives at a relatively summary moment. Moreover, *Ministry*, no matter how generically distinct from Malm's text, joins in its materialist approach and thus leaves its ideas of what is desirable circumscribed by actuality. Whatever its preferences, Robinson's book knows that open political violence (or counterviolence, really) is coming, is at least for the moment an ascendant historical fact. Moreover, for much of the 100 chapters preceding, political violence is not offered simply as inevitable but as functional, even necessary — from the relatively pacific seizure of the Davos summit, made into a weeklong reeducation camp for billionaires; to various uprisings, assassinations, and lots and lots of *ecotage*; to the brief but freighted kidnapping of the Minister for the Future which is the hinge event of the narrative, if it has such a thing. Even the eponymous Ministry itself, following and perhaps in advance of this event, gets in on the mayhem.

The two books do not simply share an attention to rising political violence in the face of capitalist climate annihilation, however. More dramatically, they offer a specific and total account of political violence — of what it is, and what it is for. The keyword is *terrorism*. The function, the goal, in truth the only possible character of political violence that these two books recognize, is persuasion. It will terrorize the powerful into believing certain things and acting on these newly instilled beliefs — or *acting as if* they are persuaded, which amounts to the same thing. "Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe," says Pascal.

What are the acts, what is the religion that must now be practiced by newly *terror-ized* global elites? It is not even *acts* plural, but a single act: *Policy reform*. Here, the two books form a powerful unity in their idea of meta-strategy for climate survival and climate repair. It will require *many* enumerable changes of great and interlocking complexity. They will take place more or less within the present frame-

[5] Ibid.

work of governance and political-economy. The extant states will continue on, with their various ruling bodies. Surplus value, the lifeblood of capital, as best we know, will still come from the same source. Within these axioms, changes will be achieved — as an extension of popular will and desperation — by the imposition of political violence toward empowering a social democratic leadership to enact sensible, humane, equitable, and finally sustainable policies.

Both books, that is to say, imagine that the only salient political violence is rhetorical violence — not in the contemporary sense of *rhetoric treated as a form of violence*, but in the sense of *violence treated as a form of rhetoric*. I promised earlier some contrariness and the time has come, but let me first insist that I do so in a comradely spirit, as an admirer of both books — and that I do so as a way of thinking *with* the books, of trying to push things forward. It is nothing more than I would say to either author, sitting in the back room of a local bar over some drinks.

This account of political violence seems to me needlessly narrowed in relation to the actualities of history, of what is already happening, of what is to come. It is commonly and persistently the case that political violence, or counterviolence, endeavors not to *send a message*, though it may do that as well, but to *bring about a circumstance.* Sometimes people might destroy lots filled with carbon-fired SUVs so that there are fewer SUVs. People are going to shut down toxin-spewing factories to protect watersheds from toxins. *People are going to blow up pipelines so that the oil doesn't flow.* Others may well take messages from these actions, as events tend to be complex and multivalent and you cannot stop people from cogitating on meaning, but that will not be the main goal or function, the operative framework.

There is much to say about this distinction, or about the inability to recognize one side of it. It is a risk of political theory that all politics becomes theory, becomes a series of signifying acts (magnifying the need for — not a critical political theory — but a critique of political theory). At the same time, the distinction before us is hardly opaque in some dramatic cases. No one (save perhaps the most abstracted of political theorists) thinks that wars, for example, are messages sent to receivers. They are designed to command territory, resources, and populations. No one thinks the Franco-Prussian war nor the Siege of Rhodes was rhetorical.

In short, state-sponsored political violence registers clearly as practical, as deployed to bring about a circumstance: command over territories, resources, and populations. Counterviolence in face of these — various anticolonial struggles offer a good example — are similarly legible. Why then do we encounter this present inability to recognize the same about climate defense? This illegibility may be not so much an artifact of political theory as a historical phenomenon, corresponding to capitalism's well-remarked character of impersonal domination: its own pretense that the transfer of wealth from one class by another is a consequence of decisions made by free subjects, decisions perhaps informed by the distant intimation of violence but still marking a process of appropriation free from immediate seizure. This is the rhetorical violence of capitalism.

I am not sure about this equation to be honest; it's an intuition, deserving of its own inquiry at a later time. There is much to say about this question of political violence within liberatory struggles in the present, and as that is the main orientation of my own scholarship and my interests, it is tempting to continue along that path. Instead, for the purposes at hand, I will instead make a last — or really next-to-last — turn to the context of social democracy itself. This is because, in the end, I think the particular account of political violence I have been drawing forth from Malm and Robinson makes sense only when social democracy, understood as a particular managerial mode for capitalism pressed up against the two limits, is understood as the horizon of political possibility.

Here I will associate social democracy and, for that matter, democratic socialism with what Moishe Postone calls "traditional Marxism," which "replaces Marx's critique of the mode of production and distribution with a critique of the mode of distribution alone."[6] Robinson makes this explicit in one of the chapters given over to a nameless philosopher or theorist or cantankerous sage who has been, in his few appearances, the book's prophet of thinking the whole, of totality. It is Chapter 99, the sage remarks that "Everything relies on capital! Please don't be stupid," invoking for many readers the work of Marx and more broadly the systematicity of capitalist relations, before glossing this total reliance: "Who has capital, how it gets distributed, that's always our question."[7] Much rests on that "our." It is perhaps Proudhon's question, Lasalle's question, the question of social democracy. It is not Marx's question, given that he took capital to be a mode of production, not of distribution.

The presentation of distribution as the only political terrain explains more or less all of the features I have extracted. It explains, for example, any sympathy toward Chenoweth and Stephen's strategic thesis regarding civil resistance, given that even in the best case, their studies give precious little indication that non-violence is effective in changing modes of production — in transforming a political economy rather than winning some limited gains, maybe swapping out one regime for another, a similar iteration. Those defeats are their idea of victory.

It further explains the faith in policy reform as a route to survival, liberation, and flourishing, since policy is indeed a useful instrument for redistribution, albeit imperfect and limited. But here we must remember that policy did not bring capitalism nor its maldistribution, much less its *inexorable drive* toward maldistribution, into the world — and cannot send it out. Maldistribution will always return. At best, faced with capitalism's intrinsic and existential character of concentrating wealth, policy can provide some temporary and partial constraints.

Now the *final* final turn. There is something linguistically strange in the idea of preserving climate, ecology, *nature*, and thereby our own existence through policy solutions, given the roots of the word "policy" in *polis*, the Greek word for "city." *City,* where the smokestack industries took hold, *city,* whose rise tracks the rise of anthropogenic climate change. I do not mean to file a brief against cities

[6] Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 69.
[7] Kim Stanley Robinson, *The Ministry for the Future.*

much less take the so-called "anti-civ" position — just to note the irony of *policy*. Its main aspect, as I suggested moments ago, is the logic of constraint. Policy begins at the edge of the city, at the border of the *polis* where it is determined who is and who is not a citizen. For better and worse, policy constrains what you can do and where you can go. It re-forms what is already formed. One cannot make someone free by policy. Even with the legal end to slavery, no one was made free, but that they had previously been made unfree; policy constrains the power to make and enforce that unfreedom. It is a relatively simple matter for policy to constrain us from sleeping under bridges, but policy alone cannot force us to sleep there, but that we first cannot afford housing; it shapes what happens in conditions of wealth and poverty, freedom and unfreedom, but it does not produce these conditions.

The policies in question for us gathered here by our hosts are not the ones imagined by Malm and by Robinson as resulting from rhetorical violence, which are by and large salutary and would be desirable if one believed, in a further irony, that policy-makers were unconstrained in their policy-making and could simply be convinced of shit. Rather, to come full circle, I speak of the policies contemplating the shared subject of Malm and Robinson, the shared subject of Hungary and Greece and Germany and the United Kingdom and North Macedonia: the climate refugee, who is the war refugee, who is the economic refugee. The refugee is, as noted previously, a refugee precisely because they have been catastrophically freed from whatever was binding them tightly in place but not freed from the demands of survival and the desire for flourishing. Now they must be put in place. And against them, against their free movement, arise the parties of order. The parties of order *put in place*. They put in place policies for the *polis*: they put in place border policies. *Constraint* comes from the Latin term meaning "to bind tightly together," but it is not refugees who are bound tightly. It is the border itself, that cruel fiction (as Wendy Trevino puts it) which is the pure fact of constraint, the edge of policy. It can bind more and less tightly but it cannot unbind. Policy is border and border is policy.

I began by rehearsing the political economy of contemporary European border policies as a way of thinking together the dialectical rise of authoritarian regimes and climate refugees confronting each other within the unrelenting determinations of the two limits that are the end of growth and climate collapse, driving a provisionally fascist renationalization that poses new or renascent parties of order against the global sway of finance and the planetary tide of refugees. But I cannot end without noticing that it would be incomplete to discuss only the right parties of order. A critical fact of the present is that we have seen this sort of development as well within various precincts on the left.

I promised you Denmark and here we are. It is on nations and governments like this that we are to pin our hopes, I suppose. Their 2020 "Climate Act," ambitious and enforceable, has been treated as a model for climate policy globally; according to the political scientist Flemming Juul Christiansen, climate policy was the only thing that the left coalition could unite behind. The Prime Minister, Mette Frederikson, a Social Democrat, campaigned on the

Act, and said on that topic, "We'll be one of the most ambitious parliaments in the world."[8]

Her other campaign theme was immigration, of course. It was on this topic that the opposition, the reactionary Danish People's Party, has been strongest. Frederikson navigated a course to electoral success not simply via popular environmental policies but by steering the Social Democrats to meet the Danish People's Party well more than halfway, establishing policies regarding refugees and asylum seekers that are even by the standards of contemporary Europe extraordinarily… restrictive. Constraining, we might say. Though we might also suggest that they are deadly. This is the left party of order in action.

Denmark, as you will know, is not alone in this — Social Democratic, Green, and other nominally progressive parties across Scandinavia and in Germany, among other places, have shifted toward increasingly restrictive border policies and ascendant hostility toward refugees, sometimes under the progressive banner of shielding domestic laborers from competition. It is a challenge to locate this border policy in relation to the conventional political spectrum. Brexit, which muddied everything, made this clear — as the question divided Labour and the Tories both and was irresolvable by any of the conventional procedures that depend on the left/right opposition.

We can certainly stamp our feet and insist that the appearance of left renationalization and left border regimes arise only because of electoral pressure from right populists and right nationalists. That is a version of the No True Scotsman fallacy. Or: that is the inner nature of "policy," of how it comes into being, how it tends toward constraint; per the previous invocation of Pascal, "Kneel down, draft your policy, and you will believe." Or: all are driven by the same material conditions, the same political-economic compulsions, the same two limits. Climate collapse and the capital's stagnation will mean there will be surplus populations and there will be refugees, and there will be a zero-sum game in which the Eurozone economy cannot expand its labor pool and intensifying pressure on resources. The redistribution which serves as the alpha and omega for Social Democrats can move in some directions and not others, as long as there is no growth. And there is no growth. Whatever one believes about the contents of various politicians' hearts, we must concede that Europe is right now developing a boom in left parties of order; this politics, alas, is certain to be a growth market. Against that only a resolute and furious internationalism will do, non-economic, without constraint, beyond policy, beyond both the reactionaries and the social democrats.

[8] See: Martin Selsoe Sorensen, *The New York Times* (June 26, 2019). https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/world/europe/denmark-prime-minister-mette-frederiksen.html